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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
Buhm-Suk Baek 
 
ABSTRACT 
The idea of human rights protection, historically, has been considered as a domestic matter, 
to be realized by individual states within their domestic law and national institutions. The 
protection and promotion of human rights, however, have become one of the most important 
issues for the international community as a whole. Yet, with time, it has become increasingly 
difficult for the international community to address human rights problems collectively. Despite 
a significant development in the human rights norms, effective protection of fundamental human 
rights and their legal enforcement has a long way to go. 
This paper will argue that economic sanctions can contribute to a decrease in individual 
states’ human rights violations and can be an effective enforcement tool for international law. 
The international community, including the U.N., should impose effective economic sanctions 
against states where gross human rights violators are.  
Economic sanctions have been widely used by the U.N. since the end of the Cold War. Their 
purpose is generally not to punish the individual state but to modify its behavior. However, such 
sanctions conflict with other fundamental principles of international law, namely the principle of 
non-intervention and state sovereignty. Economic sanctions can also conflict with the WTO’s 
first agenda: free trade. Even worse, economic sanctions are criticized because these sanctions 
are, arguably, targeted at the people at large, not to the regime, a violator of international norms.  
This paper will review the role of economic sanctions in international human rights law. 
Chapter II examines the principle of non-intervention and whether its exceptions are in 
international human rights law. Chapter III reviews the doctrines and practices of economic 
sanctions for human rights protection by the U.N. Security Council, the U.S., and the E.U. 
Chapter IV examines the legality of the economic sanctions against human rights violations 
under the WTO system and reviews the possibility of the harmonization of international 
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economic law with international human rights law. Lastly, Chapter V concludes by emphasizing 
the importance of economic sanctions against human rights violations. 
Based on the research outlined above, this paper concludes as follows: 
Chapter II maintains that the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty should 
and can be complementary. The protection and promotion of human rights can be enhanced with 
a respect for state sovereignty. In other words, each individual state has a responsibility to 
protect and promote the human rights of its own nationals based upon the principle of 
sovereignty. State sovereignty and independence should serve not as a hurdle to, but as a 
guarantee for the realization of the fundamental human rights of the state’s nationals. Chapter II 
also concludes that the concept of human rights has been expanded and the core human rights are 
inalienable and legally enforceable ones. The evolvement of international human rights law is 
one of the most remarkable innovations in modern international law. If gross human rights 
violations, especially those established by the status of Jus Cogens or obligations Erga Omnes, 
are not solved by a state itself, it is no longer solely the problem of the state concerned. 
Fundamental human rights have acquired a status of universality and the international 
community should accept this. 
Chapter III reviews the doctrines and practices of economic sanctions for human rights 
protection by the U.N. Security Council, the U.S., and the E.U. All cases of economic sanctions 
against gross human rights violations discussed, ten by the Security Council, five by the U.S. and 
seven by the E.U., were provided as samples to illustrate the idea that economic sanctions by the 
international community as a whole bolster fundamental human rights. This paper concludes that 
the sanctions by the Security Council, the U.S. and the E.U. have at least some positive effects 
on international human rights law. They build international human rights norms. This 
development also leads to the growing willingness of the international community to impose 
economic sanctions for human rights protection.  
Undeniably, economic sanctions have had some negative effects on the targeted states. In 
numerous reports and articles, scholars and human rights advocates have constantly argued that 
economic sanctions hurt large numbers of innocent civilians in the targeted states. Economic 
sanctions, however, cannot be the sole cause of civilian suffering in the targeted states. The 
targeted states should bear the heavy burden of responsibility for this suffering. It is undeniable 
that economic sanctions have inherent flaws. But, this paper disagrees with arguments for 
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opposing the use of economic sanctions because of such flaws and negative effects. The problem 
is not in the sanctions themselves, but in their effect. Therefore, the criticism on economic 
sanctions should focus on finding a way to decrease their negative effects, rather than arguing for 
not imposing them without providing a better alternative.  Overall, this chapter concludes that 
economic sanctions have become part of a collective effort by the international community to 
develop current human rights norms and to protect and promote fundamental human rights in the 
targeted states.  
Chapter IV concludes that while economic sanctions are inherently against the free trade 
provisions of the GATT, economic sanctions against gross human rights violations are allowed 
under the exceptional provisions of the GATT in the WTO system. This paper also argues that 
the GATT should be interpreted consistently with international law. That is, trade restriction 
measures against gross human rights violations are compatible with the GATT. As discussed in 
Chapter II and III, fundamental human rights violations are no longer just the domestic concern 
of each individual state. The evolvement of international human rights law demonstrates that, 
first, international human rights norms recognized as Jus Cogens provide the legality for the 
international community’s intervention in offending states; and second, the Erga Omnes status of 
international human rights norms shows that every state has an interest in other states observing 
these human rights norms. Overall, while some economic sanctions may conflict with the main 
goal of the WTO, i.e. free trade, economic sanctions against human rights violations do not 
undermine the WTO system itself. Rather, they can be adapted to the WTO’s free trade 
framework under international law. 
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there has been a 
significant evolution toward the universality of human rights. However, international legal 
enforcement systems for human rights norms are still underdeveloped despite the considerable 
progress in international human rights law. This paper concludes that economic sanctions can 
contribute to a decrease in individual states’ human rights violations and can be an effective 
enforcement tool for international law.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Second World War and the subsequent adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations (U.N.), individual states have recognized the 
necessity for human rights protection.1 The idea of human rights protection, historically, has 
been considered as a domestic one, to be realized by individual states within their domestic law 
and national institutions.2 However, the protection and promotion of human rights have become 
one of the most important issues for the international community as a whole.3 Yet, with time, it 
has become increasingly difficult for the international community to address human rights 
problems collectively.4  
International law is a “horizontal legal system,” which can be characterized as lacking a 
supreme authority, the centralization of the use of force and law enforcement generally entrusted 
to central organs.5 In terms of international law being a law, researchers focus on the absence of 
a legislature6 and on the matters of sanctions and compliance between the domestic legal 
systems and the international legal system.7 However, international law as a horizontal legal 
system operates in a different way from a centralized legal system and is based upon “principles 
of reciprocity and consensus” rather than on obedience and enforcement.8 International law is a 
useful and necessary tool for the international community because it enables states to fulfill their 
                                                          
1
 Louis Henkin, at. el., Human Rights (Foundation Press, 1999) pp.73-79; Cheong-Kyun Kim, Jae-Ho Sung, 
International Law, 5th ed., (Seoul, Pakyoungsa Publishing Co., 2003) pp.528-529. 
2
 Lori F. Damrosch, at el., Basic Documents Supplement to International Law, Cases and Materials, 4th ed., (West 
Group, 2001), p.586. 
3
 Frank Newman & David Weisbrodt, International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process (1990) pp.1-17 cited 
in Rett R. Ludwikowski, “Supreme Law or Basic Law? The Decline of the Concept of Constitutional Supremacy”, 9 
Cardoza J. Int’l & Comp. L. 253, (2001) 
4
 See Jean-Marc Coicaud, at el. ed. The Globalization of Human Rights, (United Nations University Press, 2003), 
pp.4-10. 
5
 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th ed. (Routledge, 1998), p.3. 
6
 Ibid, p.6. 
7
 Lori F. Damrosch, supra note 2, p.23. 
8
 Peter Malanczuk, supra note 5, p.6. 
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obligations, which they have chosen and agreed upon themselves, along orderly and predictable 
lines.9  
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there has been a 
significant evolution toward the universality of human rights.10 An increasing number of human 
rights conventions have been adopted to incorporate various areas of human rights: social and 
economic rights, civil and political rights, the rights of children, women, refugees and 
minorities.11 More importantly, most states in the international community have ratified a 
majority of these conventions.12 
While there has been considerable development in international human rights law, 
enforcement systems for the human rights norms are still underdeveloped. The limited 
jurisdiction and ineffective long-delayed justice of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and 
other international tribunals, as well as the refusal of the U.S. to join a majority of human rights 
treaties show that the international legal enforcement mechanisms for the protection of 
fundamental human rights against gross violations may have a long way to go.13 
This paper will argue that economic sanctions can contribute to a decrease in individual 
states’ human rights violations and can be an effective enforcement tool for international law. 
The international community, including the U.N., should impose effective economic sanctions 
against states with gross human rights violations like the Sudan in the Darfur crisis and Burma. 
Economic sanctions have been widely used by the U.N. since the end of the Cold War.14 
                                                          
9
 J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations; an Introduction to the International Law of Peace, 6th ed., Sir Humphrey 
Waldock ed. (Oxford, 1963) pp.4-5. 
10
 Seok-Yong Lee, International Law: Theory and Practice, 3rd ed., (Seoul, Sechang Publishing Co., 2003) p.475. 
11
 Richard Clayton, at. el., Law of Human Rights, (Oxford, 2001) pp.3-4. 
12
 Sarah H. Cleveland, “Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions,” 26 Yale J. Int'l L. 1 (2001) p.3. 
13
 Ibid, p.3. 
14
 August Reinisch, “Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for 
the Imposition of Economic Sanctions” 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 851, (2001) p.851. 
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Their purpose is generally not to punish the individual state but to modify its behavior.15 
However, such sanctions imposed by individual states conflict with other fundamental principles 
of international law, namely the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty. Economic 
sanctions can also conflict with the WTO’s first agenda: free trade.16 Even worse, economic 
sanctions are criticized because they target the people at large, not the regime, a violator of 
international norms. It is possible to argue that even though the U.N. imposes its sanctions to 
protect human rights, these sanctions disregard the same human rights principles themselves.17  
Therefore, this paper will review the role of economic sanctions in international human 
rights law. Chapter II examines the principle of non-intervention and its exceptions in 
international human rights law. Chapter III reviews the doctrines and practices of economic 
sanctions for human rights protection by the U.N. Security Council, the U.S., and the E.U. 
Chapter IV examines the legality of the economic sanctions against human rights violations 
under the WTO system and reviews the possibility of the harmonization of international 
economic law with international human rights law. Lastly, Chapter V concludes by emphasizing 
the importance of economic sanctions against human rights violations.
                                                          
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Sarah H. Cleveland, supra note 12, p3. 
17
 See Joy K. Fausey, “Does the United Nations’ Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate Its 
Own Human Rights Standards?” 10 Conn. J. Int’l L. 193 (1994) 
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II. SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: A DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL 
ISSUE? 
The world is still mired in widespread violations of human rights. Genocide has repeatedly 
occurred in several regions since the Second World War.18 Floods of refugees and ethnic 
conflicts continually challenge the international community’s capacity to respond; and gross 
forms of torture and execution remain commonplace.19 The most recent example involves the 
Darfur crisis in the Sudan.20 In such gross human rights violation cases, can one state (or states) 
intervene in another state’s affairs on the grounds of human rights violations? Traditional 
international law does not allow intervention in other state’s affairs. This chapter will examine 
the principle of non-intervention and whether or not there is exception for serious human rights 
violation. 
 
2.1. The Principle of Non-Intervention and Its Exception 
Oppenheim defined intervention as “forcible or dictatorial interference by a state in the 
affairs of another state, calculated to impose certain conduct or consequence on that other 
state.”21 In the 19th century, it was often associated with the armed intervention, on humanitarian 
                                                          
18
 See U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, Commission on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
Summary Record of the Second Part of the 1665th Meeting, Dialogue with Juan Mendez, Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR.1665/Add.1 (Aug, 20, 2004) (Committee Member Shahi observing 
that “regrettably, the United Nations itself had been ineffective in preventing genocide. There had been at least fifty-
five genocides since the Organization’s founding, in which approximately 75 million people had died.”) See also 
Douglas Donoho, “Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century” 35 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1. (2006) 
19
 Douglas Donoho, Ibid, p.3. 
20
 See U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to 
the U.N. Secretary-General, available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf and (its updated 
version) Report of the High-Level Mission on the situation of human rights in Darfur pursuant to Human Rights 
Council decision S-4/101, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/80. 
21
 D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), p.890. 
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or other grounds by powerful European states in the affairs of other state.22 As the 1965 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty23 indicated, it also includes other forms of 
influence or control. For example, intervention in the external affairs of another state may 
include a case in which state A sought to persuade state B to take a certain course of action by 
threats or by other measures amounting to economic coercion. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 
and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations24 also clearly 
                                                          
22
 Cheong-Kyun Kim, Jae-Ho Sung, supra note 1, p.188. 
23
 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their 
Independence and Sovereignty (21 December 1965), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131 (XX). 
The General Assembly.....solemnly declares: 
1. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats 
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned. 
2. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another 
State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it 
advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist 
or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in 
another State. 
3. The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and 
of the principle of non-intervention. 
4. The strict observance of these obligations is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace 
with one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter 
of the United Nations but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security. 
5. Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without 
interference in any form by another State. 
6. All States shall respect the right of self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely 
exercised without any foreign pressure, and with absolute respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Consequently, all States shall contribute to the complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all 
its forms and manifestations.  
7. For the purpose of the present Declaration, the term "State" covers both individual States and groups of States. 
8. Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed as affecting in any manner the relevant provisions of the Charter of 
the United Nations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular those contained in 
Chapters VI, VII and VIII. 
(The Resolution was adopted by 109 to 0, with one abstention. The one absenting state was the U.K., which 
accepted the “fundamental propositions set out in the resolution” but objected to the manner in which that resolution 
had been evolved and the imprecision of some of its language.” See 1976 B.P.I.L. 35,36.) 
24
 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1970) U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV). 
.....The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in 
accordance with the Charter   
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal 
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state the principle of non-intervention in international law. Article 2(4) of U.N. Charter is stated 
as below. 
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recognized the principle of non-intervention.25 
Numerous General Assembly Resolutions have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the 
principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention. Nowadays this principle tends to be extended 
to other means of intervention, namely economic and cultural. 26  Concerning “economic 
interference,” the principle of non-intervention reflects the nature of international law in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or 
attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in 
violation of international law.  
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State 
in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of 
any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed 
activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another 
State.  
The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of 
the principle of non-intervention.  
Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without 
interference in any form by another State.  
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as affecting the relevant provisions of the Charter relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security.  
..... To this end:   
(a) States shall co-operate with other States in the maintenance of international peace and security;  
(b) States shall co-operate in the promotion of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all, and in the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and all forms of religious 
intolerance;  
(c) States shall conduct their international relations in the economic, social, cultural, technical and trade fields in 
accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention;  
(d) States Members of the United Nations have the duty to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the 
United Nations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter.   
States should co-operate in the economic, social and cultural fields as well as in the field of science and technology 
and for the promotion of international cultural and educational progress. States should co-operate in the promotion 
of economic growth throughout the world, especially that of the developing countries. 
25
 See, for example, Case of Certain Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America) Merits. I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp.106-109, para.202-207. 
26
 Meinhard Schoroder, “Principle of Non-intervention” in R. Bernhardt ed. Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, Vol. II, (Elsevier, 1999) p.620. 
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general.27 
However, there exist exceptions to the principle of non-intervention that can be accepted in 
traditional international law. 
 
 2.1.1. Types of Interventions 
  2.1.1.1. U.N. Intervention 
In his Agenda for Peace,28 Boutrous Ghali, the former U.N. Secretary General, stated the 
strong commitment of the U.N. to achieve the great objectives of the U.N. Charter: U.N.’s 
capacity to maintain international peace and security, to secure justice and human rights and to 
promote “social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”29 Under Article 41, the 
Security Council has the power to call for non-military actions, including “complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations” in order to prevent any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace or act of aggression under Article 39.30 
The U.N. has engaged in resolving regional and national conflicts through direct and indirect 
intervention by carrying out various operations including peacekeeping and humanitarian 
assistance.31 The U.N. has played an active role in helping countries solve their internal disputes 
                                                          
27
 Ibid, p.621. 
28
 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security 
Council on 31 January 1992, “An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping” (17 
June 1992) U.N. Doc. A/47/277. S/24111., available at http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html  
29
 U.N. Charter, Preamble. 
30
 Article 41 of the U.N. Charter: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give 
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may 
include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
See also Nigel White and Ademola Abass, “Countermeasures and Sanctions” in Malcolm D. Evans ed. International 
Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, 2006) pp.509-524.  
“The U.N. clearly has the competence to override the domestic jurisdiction limitation in article 2(7) when acting 
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.” 
31
 See, in general, Website of Security Council Sanctions Committees, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/ See also 
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in order to facilitate peace agreement.32 The U.N. has also performed an effective role as 
mediator in resolving disputes, and preserving peace through its strong commitment.33 It 
indicates that ‘domestic matters’ within a certain state, as well as bilateral and multilateral 
concerns between and among states, cannot be isolated from the external intervention of the U.N. 
With a mandate to preserve peace, the U.N. is bound to do whatever is necessary and to take 
proper measures within the limits of the U.N. Charter.34 
 
  2.1.1.2. Unilateral Intervention 
While multilateral measures are explicitly provided for by the U.N. Charter, the Charter 
does not block unilateral measures to advance its purposes. While Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter prohibits unilateral measures involving the use of force, the Charter does not expressly 
prohibit unilateral non-military actions such as economic sanctions by U.N. members. 35 
However, some states argue that Articles 2(4) and 2(7), together, implicitly ban any non-military 
interference including an economic one.36 On the contrary, some eminent legal scholars like 
Oppenheim maintain that Article 2(4) is limited to the threat or use of force, and Article 2(7) is 
only applied to action by the United Nations, not by the individual member states.37 Presently, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Sarah H. Cleveland, supra note 12, pp.51-52; Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Riesman, “Rhodesia and the 
United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern,” 62 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1968) 
32
 Security Council Sanctions Committees, Ibid. 
33
 Security Council Sanctions Committees, Ibid.  
34
 See Agenda for Peace, supra note 28. 
35
 Sarah H. Cleveland, supra note 12, p.51. 
36
 See, for example, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/210 (1984) In its 39 session in 1984, the U.N. General Assembly adopted 
the resolution under the GATT:  
“Developed countries should refrain from threatening or applying trade restrictions, blockades, embargoes and other 
economic sanctions, incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and in violation of undertakings contracted, 
multilaterally or bilaterally, against developing countries as a form of political and economic coercion which affects 
their economic, political and social development.” 
37
 Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., (1992) § 132, pp.447-449. 
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no international consensus exists around any of these two positions.38 However, this paper 
argues that since unilateral intervention presents many opportunities for abuse,39 this kind of 
intervention should be carried out only after due consideration. 
 
 2.1.2. Humanitarian Intervention 
Humanitarian intervention is based upon the doctrine that there are limits to the freedoms 
states have in dealing with their own nationals.40 It should be distinguished from actions to 
protect a state’s own nationals abroad.41 When this doctrine was defined by Dutch international 
scholar Hugo Grotius and other 17th century legal scholars, it allowed one or more states to use 
force to prevent another state from mistreating its own nationals in circumstances so brutal and 
widespread that they shocked the conscience of the international community. 42  Such 
interference in a state’s domestic affairs is defended by the argument that if certain practices 
continue to take place in a state despite protest and objections by neighboring states, then 
humanitarian considerations outweigh the prohibition of intervention and justify a decision to 
interfere.43 Overall, the arguments for humanitarian intervention can be summarized as follows: 
“ultimately, peace is more endangered by tyrannical contempt for human rights than by attempts 
to assert, through intervention, the holiness of human personality.”44 
In the 19th century, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was widely abused by states 
                                                          
38
 Nigel White and Ademola Abass, supra note 30. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ray August, Public International Law, (Prentice Hall, 1995), pp.251-252. 
41
 U.K. Foreign Office Policy Document No. 148, 57 BYIL 614 (1986) II.18; Dae-Soon Kim, International Law, 
11th ed. (Seoul: Samyoungsa, 2006), pp.1075-1078. 
42
 Ray August, supra note 40. 
43
 Gerhard Von Glahn, Law among Nations: an introduction to public international law, 7th ed., (Longman, 1996) 
p.582. 
44
 U.K. Foreign Office Policy Document No. 148, supra note 41, II.20. 
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which intervened to advance their own interests.45 For example, in 1860 and 1861 France 
occupied parts of Syria and policed its coast by warships based upon the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention in order to stop the massacre of Maronite Christians.46 The motives 
behind France’s action, however, have been criticized in the context of the historical record.47 
It is hard to reconcile a state’s sovereignty with fundamental human rights48 and there was 
little express support from states for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention by individual 
states, other than from the U.K.49. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also rejects humanitarian 
intervention as having no legal basis in the U.N. Charter.50  
This paper argues that the time is not yet ripe for recognizing humanitarian intervention as 
an established exception to the principle of non-intervention. The reasons are as follows: first, 
the U.N. Charter and the current international treaties do not seem to incorporate such a doctrine 
specifically. Second, in the last two centuries, and especially since the end of the Second World 
War, only very few cases can be considered a genuine humanitarian intervention, if any at all. 
Last, the scope for abuse of humanitarian intervention overshadows its usefulness.  
However, it is certain that there is increasing international interest in the development of a 
                                                          
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Istvan Pogany, “Humanitarian Intervention in International Law: The French Intervention in Syria Re-Examined” 
35 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 182 (1986) pp.182-190. 
48
 Ray August, supra note 40. 
49
 See Christine Gray, “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order” in Malcolm D. Evans ed. International 
Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, 2006) pp.594-597. 
50
 Declaration of the Group of 77 South Summit held in Havana from 10 to 14 April 2000, para.54. available at 
www.nam.gov.za/documentation/southdecl.htm  
54. We stress the need to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian assistance and other activities of the 
United Nations. We reject the so-called "right" of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the United 
Nations Charter or in the general principles of international law... We further stress the need for scrupulously 
respecting the guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 
46/182, and emphasize that these principles are valid, time-tested and must continue to be fully observed. 
Furthermore, we stress that humanitarian assistance should be conducted in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and political independence of host countries, and should be initiated in response to a request or with the 
approval of these States. 
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detailed framework for humanitarian intervention51 and that at least in cases like Darfur, there 
should be a duty to intervene. 
 
 2.1.3. The Nicaragua Case  
The 1986 Nicaragua v. the United States case heard by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) is important in terms of the principle of non-intervention.52 In addition to considering 
arguments on the use of force and collective self-defense, the ICJ addressed the international law 
relating to intervention and the right of third states to take countermeasures in response to 
intervention which does not amount to an armed attack. The ICJ considered the argument that the 
U.S. action was a legitimate response to Nicaragua’s action in support of the insurgents in El 
Salvador, although Nicaragua’s action did not amount to an armed attack. The Court first defined 
the principle of non-intervention as follows: 
205... the principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in 
internal or external affairs of other States.  A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one 
bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide 
freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the 
formulation of foreign policy.  Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard 
to such choices, which must remain free ones.  The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed 
forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an 
intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of 
support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State… 53 
The ICJ concluded that the principle of non-intervention was established as a matter of 
customary international law. The court found that there was no exception in favor of a right to 
                                                          
51
 Christine Gray, supra note 49, p.596. 
52
 T. Modibo Ocran, “The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in light of Robust Peacekeeping” 25 B.C. Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 1. (2002) p.15. 
53
 Case of Certain Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 25. 
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intervention to support “an internal opposition in another state, whose cause appears particularly 
worthy by reason of the political and moral values with which it was identified.”54 Applying the 
principle of non-intervention to the facts of the case, the court concluded that the U.S. support 
for “the military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua by financial support, 
training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic support, constitutes a clear breach of the 
principle of non-intervention.”55 
However, on the issue of the accordance of economic coercion with international law, when 
reviewing the U.S. economic coercion toward Nicaragua, the ICJ concluded that it was “unable 
to regard such action on the economic plane as is here complained of as a breach of the 
customary law principle of non-intervention.”56 Therefore, this paper argues that at this point, it 
appears that nothing forbids the use of economic sanctions in customary international law.  
 
2.2. The International Human Rights Law 
The international human rights law has been developed through the general treaties, 
declarations of international institutions like the United Nations, and customary international 
law.57 The issue of human rights has also advanced through conventions, state practices, and the 
endeavors of NGOs and private entities.58  
                                                          
54
 Ibid, para.206. 
55
 Ibid, para.242. 
56
 Ibid, para.245. 
57
 Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 
2000) p.561. 
58
 For example, Restatement of the Law on Foreign Relations Law of the United States (REST 3d FOREL § 701, 
702) stated that: 
§ 701. Obligation To Respect Human Rights 
A state is obligated to respect the human rights of persons subject to its jurisdiction 
(a) that it has undertaken to respect by international agreement; 
(b) that states generally are bound to respect as a matter of customary international law (§ 702); and  
(c) that it is required to respect under general principles of law common to the major legal systems of the world. 
§ 702. Customary International Law Of Human Rights 
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 2.2.1. Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes 
Normally in classic international law, there is no hierarchy of sources or rules of 
international law, at least such as between the two primary laws, custom and treaty.59 However, 
since the late 1960s, there has been an argument that “certain norms governing relations between 
states should be given a higher rank than ordinary rules deriving from treaties and custom.”60 
Finally, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (as well as that of 1986) provided, 
in Article 53: Treaties Conflicting with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law (Jus 
Cogens), the following: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.61 
On the other hand, there are certain international obligations that have achieved the position 
of customary international law in the sense that they are binding to all states without exception.62 
These obligations are defined in two paragraphs from the ICJ judgment in the Barcelona 
Traction case in 1970. The complete text of these paragraphs follows below:  
33. When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether natural 
or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones 
(a) genocide, 
(b) slavery or slave trade, 
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,  
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, 
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention, 
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or 
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. 
59
 Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 2005) pp.198-199. 
60
 Ibid, p.199 
61
 Art.53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/27. 
62
 See Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, (Oxford, 1997) pp.1-17. 
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concerning the treatment to be afforded them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor 
unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a 
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State in 
the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In 
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations erga omnes. 
34. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of 
acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic 
rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the 
corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law 
(Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23); others are conferred by international instruments of 
a universal or quasi-universal character.63 (emphasis added.) 
Similarly, it is widely accepted that fundamental human rights violations no longer belong to 
the domestic jurisdiction of individual states. As stated above in regard to the Barcelona 
Traction case, the ICJ considered certain “basic rights of the human person” such as protection 
from slavery, racial discrimination, or genocide as obligations Erga Omnes. The ICJ judgment 
shows that the court has clearly accepted that the obligation to respect fundamental human rights 
is an obligation of international law. Professor Antonio Cassese argues that, “the principle on 
human rights entitles all members of the international community to demand compliance and, in 
case of gross and large-scale infringements, to request their cessation.”64  
However, identifying the international human rights that constitute Jus Cogens or 
obligations Erga Omnes still remains an open question. At least, prohibition and protection from 
slavery, racial discrimination, genocide, and torture are generally accepted by the international 
community as basic human rights. Indeed, a consensus has been reached regarding certain core 
                                                          
63
 Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Second Phase) (Belgium v. Spain) . 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p32, para.33-34.  
64
 Antonio Cassese, supra note 59, p.65. 
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human rights principles, including the ones above.65 
 
 2.2.2. International Human Rights Law and the Limitation on State Sovereignty 
As international law has been developed basically from the consent of individual states, it 
can be argued that such consent puts certain limits on state sovereignty. Article 24 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, also provides this underlying principle: 
1. A treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it may provide or as the 
negotiating States may agree.  
2. Failing any such provision or agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon as consent to be 
bound by the treaty has been established for all the negotiating States. 
3. When the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is established on a date after the treaty has 
come into force, the treaty enters into force for that State on that date, unless the treaty otherwise 
provides. 
4. The provisions of a treaty regulating the authentication of its text, the establishment of the 
consent of States to be bound by the treaty, the manner or date of its entry into force, reservations, 
the functions of the depositary and other matters arising necessarily before the entry into force of 
the treaty apply from the time of the adoption of its text. 
The U.N. Charter also imposes certain restrictions on member states’ sovereignty by giving 
the Security Council the power to intervene or permit intervention where there is a threat to or 
breach of international peace. Article 24 (1) and (2) of the U.N. Charter clearly state this 
principle: 
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the 
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their 
behalf.  
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the 
                                                          
65
 See Maurizio Ragazzi, supra note 62, pp.132-163. 
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discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.  
In the same manner, when states agree to bilateral, multilateral or customary human rights 
norms through human rights treaties or customary human rights law, their sovereignty will be 
limited by such norms.66 
The first effort to protect and promote human rights on a global level was the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the Declaration).67 Even though the Declaration has no 
legal binding force, the basic human rights principles which are expressed in the Declaration are 
generally considered universal.68 The Declaration itself was the basis of two foundational 
international human rights conventions: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)69 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)70. 
Both covenants successfully transfer the Declaration into a binding treaty law. Based upon the 
Declaration, a number of additional treaties which address specific categories of fundamental 
human rights have been widely ratified. They are the four Geneva Conventions in Time of War71 
and the subsequent 1977 Additional Protocols,72  the Genocide Convention,73  the Torture 
                                                          
66
 Jianming Shen, “National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a Positive Law Context” 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 417 
(2000) pp.428-429. 
67
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948) 
68
 Elizabeth Shaver Duquette, “Human Rights in the European Union: Internal Versus External Objectives”, 34 
Cornell Int'l L.J. 363 (2001) pp.375-376. 
69
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 
70
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. 
71
 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force Oct. 21, 
1950.; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 
21, 1950.; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 
entered into force Oct. 21, 1950. 
72
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.; Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978. 
73
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force Jan. 
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Convention, 74  the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 75  the 
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women,76 and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child.77 Regional agreements that substantially incorporate the core principles 
of the Declaration include the European Convention on Human Rights, 78  the American 
Convention on Human Rights,79 and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.80 
These evolving human rights treaties suggest that human rights issues should not be 
overlooked and at least, gross violations of human rights are no longer the exclusive concerns of 
each individual state’s domestic jurisdiction. Furthermore, they suggest that the protection and 
promotion of human rights should be achieved through international law which includes the 
principle of state sovereignty.81 
It is undeniable that protection of human rights and respect for state sovereignty are both 
important items in current international law. The problem is how to protect and promote human 
rights without impairing the principle of state sovereignty under the existing international legal 
system. That is, whether there is potentiality to limit the principle of state sovereignty used to 
protect a state from international responses to its serious violations of obligations under the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12, 1951. 
74
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. res. 39/46, 
[annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)], entered into force June 26, 1987. 
75
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 
20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), entered into force Jan. 4, 1969. 
76
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981. 
77
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. 
A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2 1990. 
78
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered 
into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on 21 September 
1970, 20 December 1971, 1 January 1990, and 1 November 1998 respectively.  
79
 American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force July 
18, 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992). 
80
 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 
5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986 
81
 Jianming Shen, supra note 66, p.434. 
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evolving international human rights law. 
The view that sovereign rights of states should be defied in the case of certain human rights 
violations because gross human rights violations can give legal grounds for defying the principle 
of state sovereignty, has been gaining momentum.82 On the other hand, developing and least-
developed countries stress the importance of “the inviolability of national sovereignty, political 
independence and territorial integrity” while also admitting “the need for international 
cooperation to address problems of massive and systematic violations of human rights.”83 
This paper argues that the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty should 
and can be complementary.  
The protection and promotion of human rights can be enhanced by the respect for a state’s 
sovereignty. States should be viewed not as deniers of human rights, but as protectors and 
promoters of the human rights of their nationals. Respect for state sovereignty can be realized by 
protecting the fundamental rights of a state’s nationals through the national law. In other words, 
this paper argues that each individual state has a responsibility to protect and promote the human 
rights of its own nationals based upon the principle of sovereignty. State sovereignty and 
independence should serve not as a hurdle to, but as a guarantee for the realization of the 
fundamental human rights of the state’s nationals. Each individual state, then, should cooperate 
with other states in order to carry out their obligations under state sovereignty and international 
                                                          
82
 See generally, Jarat Chopra & Thomas G. Weiss, “Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying 
Humanitarian Intervention,” 6 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 95 (1992); Anne Bodley, “Weakening the Principle of 
Sovereignty in International Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” 31 N.Y.U. J. 
INT'L L. & POL. 417 (1999); Jianming Shen, supra note 66. 
83
 See, for example, Press Release, U.N. GA/9606, “Questions of Sovereignty, the State System, the Future of the 
Organization Raised by General Debate Speakers,” (Sept. 24, 1999) (including Singapore, Iraq, Dominican Republic, 
Kazakhstan, and Iran); Press Release, U.N. GA/9627, “General Assembly Begins Discussion on Secretary-General's 
Annual Report on Work of Organization” (Oct. 6, 1999) (including Colombia, Kuwait, Mongolia, China, 
Bangladesh, India, Venezuela); Press Release, U.N. GA/9633, “Importance of State Sovereignty, Need to Address 
Human Rights Violations, Council Reform, Discussed in Assembly” (Oct. 8, 1999) (including Cuba, Algeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, andthe Sudan). 
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human rights law. 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
It seems that state sovereignty and the protection of human rights are mutually challenged in 
international law. The principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states has 
been considered as a vital tool in ensuring peace and harmony among states.  
However, evolving international human rights law now requires a re-examination of this 
principle. Now, an individual state’s domestic concerns frequently pose a serious threat to the 
peace and stability of the region and the international community. Admittedly, humanitarian 
intervention had been abused in the past by strong states to pursue other political, economic or 
military objectives.84 Further, the legitimacy of the right to intervention under the U.N. Charter 
is debatable under the well-established principle of non-intervention codified in Article 2(4) and 
2(7) of the Charter. This paper, however, believes that to a certain extent, as Sir Hartley 
Shawcross confidently declared at the Nuremberg Trials, “[t]he right of humanitarian 
intervention on behalf of the rights of man, trampled upon by a state in a manner shocking the 
sense of mankind, has long been considered to form part of the recognized law of nations.”85 
The concept of human rights today has been expanded and the core human rights are 
considered inalienable and legally enforceable. The concept of sovereignty also has been 
developed further and one of its main elements is the protection of a state’s nationals’ 
fundamental rights from state interference and the abuse of power by the government. The 
evolvement of international human rights law is one of the most remarkable innovations in 
                                                          
84
 Peter Malanczuk, supra note 5, p.221. 
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 The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 3, Tuesday, 4 December 1945, 
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/12-04-45.htm  
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modern international law.86 If gross human rights violations, especially those that rise to the 
level of Jus Cogens or obligations Erga Omnes, are not solved by the state itself, they are no 
longer the sole problem of this state. Therefore, this paper argues that the fundamental human 
rights have risen to a position of ‘universality’ and the international community should accept 
this.
                                                          
86
 Peter Malanczuk, supra note 5, p.211. 
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III. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
With increasing frequency since the 1990s, we have been witnessing the gradual emergence 
of a modern version of humanitarian intervention in cases of gross human rights violations, 
especially through economic sanctions.87 Economic sanctions are generally imposed in two 
ways: by the U.N. Security Council and by individual states, mostly the U.S. and the E.U. 
countries. This chapter will review the use of economic sanctions first internationally and then 
domestically. 
 
3.1. The Use of Economic Sanctions 
International economic law is based upon treaties regarding “the reciprocal liberalization of 
market access and the protection of economic freedom and private property rights,”88 even 
though they are not mentioned in either the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)89 or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)90 
However, it is clear that international economic law has continued to affect positively the scope 
of human rights protection. For example, a post-Uruguay round inventory of potential agenda 
items for the world trading system includes such important questions on human rights as 
“competition policy, environmental controls and policies, the link between economic sanctions 
and human rights, the problems of arms control, and the general question of international 
economic sanctions and their relation to world order.”91  
Upon reviewing the customary international law concerning economic measures, no 
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 Thomas Buergenthal, “The evolving International Human Rights System”, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 783 (2006) p.790. 
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 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to constitutionalize the U.N. 
Dispute Settlement Sytem?” 31 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 753 (1999) p.771. 
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 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69. 
90
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 70. 
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 John H. Jackson, “International Economic Law” in R. Bernhardt ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Vol. II, (ELSEVIER, 1999), p.32. 
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important norms are to be found except those related to expropriations and nationalizations. 
However, international norms on human rights have been increasingly incorporated into 
discussions and negotiations on economic matters since the end of the Cold War.92 
Economic sanctions are “highly controversial foreign policy tools” that have drawn a fair 
amount of criticism.93 It is difficult to name a term of public international law, whose definition 
is vaguer than that of economic sanction. As stated in Chapter II, this is partly because of the 
relationship between economic sanctions and the prohibition of intervention which itself lacks a 
clear definition.94 Economic sanctions can be defined as “coercive foreign policy action[s] ..... 
[that] intentionally suspend customary economic relations such as trade and/or financial 
exchanges in order to prompt the targeted state to change its policy or behavior.”95 The U.N. 
General Assembly emphasized the principle of non-intervention by economic measures in the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of December 12, 1974.96 Economic sanctions 
generally center on trade embargoes, financial (loan and transfer) restrictions, and transportation 
(land, sea, air) prohibitions, as well as restrictions on arms shipments.97 
 
 
                                                          
92
 John H. Jackson, at el., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 4th ed., (West Group, 2002), 
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Chapter 1 (Fundamentals of International Economic Relations) 
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d. Non-intervention;  
k. Respect for human rights and international obligations 
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 3.1.1. Countermeasures 
Countermeasures against an offending state for violation of an international law may be 
taken by the offended through joint or parallel actions.98 Such actions have generally involved 
severance of diplomatic relations, trade boycotts and in some cases, cessation of air or sea 
traffic.99 These measures, if not contrary to treaty obligation, fall within the discretion of each 
individual state. Where these measures are contrary to treaty obligations or customary 
international norms, they may be legally justified as reprisals.100 In certain cases, states which 
have not been directly injured can join in collective countermeasures on the basis that the 
violation has an impact on “a common concern of the international community.”101 As discussed 
in Chapter II, an emphasis on the common concern of states in struggling with such acts as 
aggression, terrorism or serious violations of human rights is in accord with the concept of duties 
Erga Omnes. 
In the past, states could even go to war to enforce their legal rights. However, this is no more 
lawful except in certain exceptions like self-defence against armed attack.102 The remaining 
forms of self-help are countermeasures like retorsion and reprisals.103 Retorsion is a lawful act 
which is meant to punish the violating state by, for example cutting off economic aid.104 
Reprisal is an act which would usually be illegal but which is rendered legal by a prior illegal act 
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committed by the other state.105 One disadvantage of retorsion and reprisal is that the state 
imposing these measures may injure itself as much as the state against which they are 
designed.106 Specifically, this can happen when one state cuts off trade with the violating state. 
A more serious disadvantage of self-help is that it works effectively only if the injured state is 
more powerful than the violating state.107  
Therefore, sanctions are increasingly imposed by large groups of states, working through 
international organizations such as the U.N. Security Council. However, the U.N. Security 
Council has imposed sanctions only in limited circumstances108 because the veto power of the 
five permanent members often has paralyzed the imposition of sanctions. Though the U.N. 
General Assembly is not subject to the veto, its resolutions are not legally binding. The decisions 
of both the Security Council and the General Assembly are generally based upon political 
considerations.109 
It is undeniable that sanctions work less effectively in international law than in domestic law. 
There are more than 190 states and as only few states have strong political and economic power, 
the other states are too weak to impose sanctions against them. 
This paper, however, argues that this does not mean that international law as a whole works 
less effectively than domestic law. International law just works in a different way.110 
 
 3.1.2. Legality of Economic Sanctions under the International Law 
States targeted by economic sanctions claim that states imposing economic sanctions violate 
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the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty under the Article 2(7) of the U.N. 
Charter.111 That is, economic sanctions intervene with the target state’s domestic jurisdiction 
and state sovereignty. However, in 1999 the U.N. issued a report of the Secretary-General 
according to which states may use economic sanctions on other states for affirming existing 
international norms.  
Reaffirming that no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of 
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its 
sovereign rights, 
1. Calls upon the international community to adopt urgent and effective measures to eliminate the 
use by some developed countries of unilateral economic coercive measures against developing 
countries that are not authorized by relevant organs of the United Nations or are inconsistent with 
the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations, as a means of forcibly imposing the 
will of one State on another;”112  
By analogy, in other circumstances, especially when it is a matter of upholding concrete 
international principles, economic sanctions may be allowed under the international law. 
Similarly, in 1984 the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution on Economic Measures 
as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries. 
2. Reaffirms that developed countries should refrain from threatening or applying trade restrictions, 
blockades, embargoes and other economic sanctions, incompatible with the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations and in violation of undertakings contracted multilaterally or 
bilaterally, against developing countries as a form of political and economic coercion which affects 
their economic, political and social development;113 
This resolution should also be interpreted to mean that the individual state’s use of economic 
sanctions may not be a violation against the U.N. Charter automatically, while certain sanctions 
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which meet the conditions of the resolution should be considered illegal under international 
law.114 
Furthermore, there are no clear customary international norms against the use of economic 
sanctions, even if economic sanctions may be considered an intervention into another state’s 
sovereignty.115 The end of the Cold War has allowed the Security Council to use economic 
sanctions more widely ever since the 1990s.116 Because of the firm principle of prohibition of 
use of force under the U.N. Charter, individual states have used various forms of economic 
sanctions to settle disputes.117 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also found that economic 
sanctions do not violate the customary international norm of non-intervention.118 
Overall, the international community has been increasingly willing to recognize gross 
human rights violations as a matter which threatens regional and international peace and to 
endorse economic sanctions and sometimes even military interventions, in places like Somalia, 
Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, the 
Sudan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In light of the increasing use of 
economic sanctions, this paper argues that the use of economic sanctions has become an 
accepted customary international norm.119  
As discussed in Chapter II, one of the most significant developments in international law in 
the last decades has been the wide recognition of human rights. Gross human rights violations 
have been increasingly accepted as matters of international concern that warrant multilateral and 
sometimes unilateral intervention by states. Therefore, this paper maintains that economic 
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sanctions against human rights violations are fully consistent with international law including the 
U.N. Charter to protect and promote fundamental human rights. 
 
3.2. Economic Sanctions by the U.N. Security Council 
When the U.N. Security Council decides that there is “the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” its actions fall in one of following categories.120 
It may call upon the member states to apply “measures not involving the use of armed forces” 
like the closure of economic relations or the severance of diplomatic relations,121 or may call for 
the use of armed forces which is “necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”122 Several cases of economic sanctions by the Security Council, applied, at least 
partially, for human rights violations, are discussed below. 
 
 3.2.1. Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia 
The first major instance of economic sanctions specifically or at least ostensibly in an effort 
to vindicate human rights was the case of Southern Rhodesia. The U.N. Security Council 
authorized sanctions against Rhodesia for the first time in 1965;123  they lasted until the 
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restoration of British rule in December 1979.124 It was mainly against the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence (UDI) by the white minority government of the Southern Rhodesia territory in 
1965.125 Based upon the two resolutions in 1965,126 the Security Council called on member 
states of the U.N. not to recognize or assist the illegal regime and in particular to break all 
economic and arms relations with it. In 1966127 and 1968,128 the Security Council went further 
by imposing selective mandatory economic sanctions on Rhodesia. However, the sanctions were 
not universally adhered to. South Africa, Portugal, Israel, Iran and some Arab states helped 
Rhodesia in various ways. In 1970,129 1972,130 and 1973,131 finally the Security Council 
rendered comprehensive economic sanctions. They were terminated in 1979 as a result of the 
agreement leading to the independence of Zimbabwe.132  The white minority government 
consented in the agreement mainly out of economic concern, namely, they needed to preserve 
their economic stability and capital from sanctions. 
 
 3.2.2. Sanctions against Iraq 
The sanctions against Iraq were one of the most comprehensive ranges of economic 
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sanctions imposed by the Security Council. They were adopted in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait (the Gulf War) in 1990.133 Based upon Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, Security 
Council Resolution 661 affirmed the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence and 
also expressed concern about further loss of human life.134 This resolution imposed a wide range 
of economic sanctions on Iraq, including the prohibition of all imports from and exports to Iraq 
and the occupied Kuwait, and the transfer of funds to Iraq and Kuwait.135 Furthermore, the 
Security Council decided that “all states shall not make available to the government of Iraq or to 
any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other 
financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their 
territories.....from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait.....”136 
Subsequently, the Security Council established a committee composed of all members of the 
Council to control the implementation of economic sanctions under Security Council Resolution 
666.137 The committee was instructed to keep the situation regarding food in Iraq and Kuwait 
under constant review.138 This committee was also directed to remember that food supplies 
should be supported through the U.N. in cooperation with the International Committee of the 
Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their 
supervision.139 
Condemning the gross human rights violation by Iraq, for example, “the treatment by Iraqi 
forces of Kuwait nationals, including measures to force them to leave their own country and 
mistreatment of persons and property.....[and] its holding of third-state nationals against their 
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will,” Security Council Resolution 670140 tightened the binding economic sanctions imposed on 
Iraq. Through this Resolution, the Council decided that all states, irrespective of any 
international agreements or contracts, licenses or permits in existence, were to refuse permission 
to any aircraft to take off from their territory, if the aircraft was carrying cargo to or from Iraq or 
Kuwait.141 In addition, states were to refuse permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or 
Kuwait to overfly their territory.142 
After the end of the 1991 Gulf War, these economic sanctions against Iraq were linked to the 
removal of the weapons of mass destruction by Security Council Resolution 687.143 Based upon 
this Resolution, Iraq was called upon to accept the destruction or removal of all chemical and 
biological weapons and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.144 
Since the Council did not lift the sanctions, they were increasingly criticized for inflicting 
humanitarian suffering on innocent civilians, lack of clear criteria for termination, and the failure 
to put direct pressure on Iraq's leader.145  In response to the criticism for the sanctions’ 
humanitarian impact, several Security Council resolutions were introduced that allowed the sale 
of Iraqi oil in exchange for food and medicine. The earliest of these resolutions were introduced 
in 1991. Security Council Resolution 706 was adopted to allow the sale of Iraqi oil in exchange 
for food and medicine.146 Security Council Resolution 712 confirmed that Iraq could sell oil to 
fund a U.N. “Oil-for-Food Program.”147 In 1995, under Security Council Resolution 986, Iraq 
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was allowed to export more oil with which to purchase items needed to sustain the civilian 
population.148 The first Iraqi oil under “the Oil-for-Food Program” was exported in December 
1996 and the first shipments of food arrived in March 1997.149 The sanctions were finally lifted 
on May 22, 2003 by Security Council Resolution 1483.150 Overall, sanctions on Iraq were 
proven unsuccessful because they were neither designed for immediate implementation nor well-
planned with a more long term approach. Furthermore, the role of various agencies in the 
implementation and monitoring of the sanctions were unclear. 
 
 3.2.3. Sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Under Security Council Resolution 757, the Council imposed a wide range of economic 
sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on May, 1992.151 
These sanctions are also related to the protection of human rights as the Council announced its 
concern for the continued expulsion of non-Serb civilians152 and noted the “urgent need for 
humanitarian assistance and the various appeals made in this connection” under the former 
Resolution 752.153  
Resolution 757 prohibited the import of goods from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
the export or trans-shipment of such goods by states or their nationals and the sale or supply of 
any commodities or products to any person or body in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or to 
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any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from it.154 This 
resolution also prohibited all states from making available to the authorities in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking there, any 
funds or any other financial or economic resources.155 In addition, it posited that all states should 
prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from providing any funds or 
resource at all to anyone within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, except for payments 
exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs.156 
The sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were tightened under Security 
Council Resolution 787.157 Through this resolution, the Council decided that “any vessel in 
which a majority or a controlling interest was held by a person or undertaking in or operating 
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be considered, for the purpose of implementation 
of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, a vessel of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia regardless of the flag under which the vessel sails.”158 Extensive maritime control 
measures were also adopted under this resolution. 
The scope of these sanctions was extended by Security Council Resolution 820159 on the 
U.N. protected areas in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
under the control of Bosnian Serb forces.160 Security Council Resolution 942161 extended the 
sanctions to include “economic activities carried on within their territories by any entity which is 
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by any person or any entity in those areas of the 
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Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces.”162  
As peace negotiations progressed, the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
were gradually eased. After the Dayton Peace Agreement was initiated, most sanctions were 
suspended indefinitely by Security Council Resolution 1022,163 except for the measures imposed 
on the Bosnian Serb forces.164 This resolution also released the frozen assets with the decision 
that “all funds and assets previously frozen or impounded pursuant to resolutions 757 (1992) and 
820 (1993) may be released by States in accordance with law, provided that any such funds and 
assets that are subject to any claims, liens, judgments, or encumbrances, or which are the funds 
or assets of any person, partnership, corporation, or other entity found or deemed insolvent under 
law or the accounting principles prevailing in such State, shall remain frozen or impounded until 
released in accordance with applicable law, and decides further that obligations of States.”165 All 
sanctions were fully lifted by Security Council Resolution 1074166 after the elections in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina which satisfied the requirements of the Peace Agreement.167 Overall, sanctions 
played significant role to establish the Peace Agreement because they were well designed and 
applied limited measures with understanding the requirements for effective enforcement. 
 
 3.2.4. Sanctions against Somalia 
Concerned about “the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of 
human life and widespread material damage resulting from the conflict in the country,” under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council first imposed a general and complete arms 
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embargo on Somalia in 1992 with the adoption of Resolution 733.168 It demanded that all states 
implement immediately a general and complete arms embargo on all deliveries of weapons and 
military equipment to Somalia.169  
With time, the Council adopted certain exceptions to the arms embargo to meet the changes 
of the political and economic situation in Somalia.  
Under Resolution 1356,170 protective clothing for humanitarian and development workers 
and non-lethal military equipment solely for humanitarian or protective use were excluded from 
the arms embargo.171 In 2006, through Resolution 1726,172 weapons and military equipment and 
technical training and assistance intended solely for the support of or use by the force of ‘the 
Transitional Federal Institutions’ of Somalia became exceptions to the arms embargo, as well.173 
Overall, in Somalia, sanctions did not contribute to pressure the parties to negotiate a 
peaceful agreement or to constrain the military capabilities of the rebel movements, because of 
the useless monitoring system and enforcement procedures, namely applying ineffective arms 
embargoes without providing meaningful solutions. 
 
 3.2.5. Sanctions against Rwanda 
The Security Council resolution concerning Rwanda is one of the distinct examples of 
economic sanctions against gross human rights violations. In Resolution 918,174 the Council 
strongly condemned the genocide which took place in Rwanda and the impunity of armed 
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individuals. The Council was also concerned that “the situation in Rwanda, which has resulted in 
the death of many thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children, the internal 
displacement of a significant percentage of the Rwandan population, and the massive exodus of 
refugees to neighbouring countries, constitutes a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions.” 
As a result, under this resolution, a complete arms embargo on Rwanda was imposed by the 
Security Council.175 It terminated on September 1996, pursuant to paragraph 8 of Resolution 
1011.176 However, in this resolution, the Security Council prohibits the sale or supply of all 
types of arms and related materials to Rwanda, other than to the government of Rwanda.177 It 
also prevents the sale or supply of any arms to persons in the neighboring states of Rwanda for 
the purpose of the use of such arms or related materials within Rwanda.178 These exceptional 
measures are still in effect because of the concern that anti-government forces might use such 
arms or related materials.179   
 
 3.2.6. Sanctions against Sierra Leone 
Deeply concerned about the continued violence, the loss of life and the aggravated human 
rights conditions in Sierra Leone following the military coup on 25 May 1997, the Security 
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Council has issued several resolutions since the adoption of Resolution 1132180 in 1997. The 
economic sanctions, including an arms embargo on non-state actors and a travel ban are still in 
effect in Sierra Leone.  
Security Council Resolution 1171 is the most notable one in this respect. In paragraphs 2, 4, 
and 5, the Council prohibited all states from the sale and supply of all types of arms or related 
materials to Sierra Leone except to the government of Sierra Leone, and from allowing the entry 
into or transit through their territories of leading members of the former military junta and of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF).181 
In Resolution 1171, the Security Council also indicated that all sanctions will expire “once 
the control of the Government of Sierra Leone has been fully re-established over all its territory, 
and when all non-governmental forces have been disarmed and demobilized.”182 
However, the sanctions on the import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone, imposed by 
Resolution 1306183 and renewed by Resolution 1446184, were terminated in 2003 by the decision 
of the Security Council.185 This was the result of the increasing efforts of the government of 
Sierra Leone to control and manage its diamond industry and to ensure proper control over 
diamond mining areas.186 
 
 3.2.7. Sanctions against Liberia 
To establish peace and stability in Liberia and its regions, the Security Council has adopted 
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several resolutions to impose sanctions since 1995. These include Security Council Resolution 
985187  from 1995 and Security Council Resolution 1343188  from 2001. The most recent 
sanctions are based upon Resolution 1521189 from 2003. The sanctions have been modified by 
subsequent resolutions like Security Council Resolutions 1532190 and 1683.191 In 2006, the 
Security Council extended the sanctions against Liberia by Resolution 1731.192  
The sanctions include an arm embargo, a travel ban, and an assets freeze. Concerning the 
arms embargo, the Security Council decided that “all States shall take the necessary measures to 
prevent the supply to Liberia of arms and related materiel of all types and also of technical 
training and assistance.”193 Concerning the travel ban, the Council prevented all States from the 
entry into or transit through their territories of individuals on the Travel Ban List.194 Lastly, 
concerning the assets freeze, the Council decided that “all States shall freeze without delay funds, 
other financial assets and economic resources owned or controlled by individuals and entities” 
on the Assets Freeze List.195 The Travel Ban List and the Assets Freeze List are maintained and 
regularly updated by the Security Council.196 
With time, some of the items in the sanctions were excluded. In 2006, the Security Council 
decided to allow the timber sanctions197 to expire based upon the government of Liberia’s 
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commitment to transparent management of the country’s forestry resources.198 In 2007, the 
Security Council decided to terminate the diamond sanctions199 under Resolution 1753.200 
 
 3.2.8. Sanctions against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
To establish peace in the DRC and prevent the illegal exploitation of natural resources from 
financing armed groups in the Eastern part of the DRC, the Security Council has adopted several 
resolutions since 2003.  
The Council first imposed an arms embargo on “all foreign and Congolese armed groups 
and militias operating in the territory of North and South Kivu and Ituri, and on groups not party 
to the Global and All-inclusive agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” with the 
adoption of Resolution 1493201 in 2003.  
The sanctions were modified and strengthened with the successive adoption of Resolutions 
1533,202 1596,203 1649,204 and 1698.205 Under these resolutions, the Security Council expanded 
the scope of the arms embargo and imposed additional sanctions, including a travel ban and an 
assets freeze. The U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee which was established based 
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upon Resolution 1533206 maintains and regularly updates both the Travel Ban List and the 
Assets Freeze List.207 
 
 3.2.9. Sanctions against Côte d’Ivoire 
Deeply concerned about the human rights situation in Côte d’Ivoire, “in particular in the 
northern part of the country, and [about] the use of the media, in particular radio and television 
broadcasts, to incite hatred and violence against foreigners in Côte d’Ivoire,” in 2004 the 
Security Council imposed sanctions against Côte d’Ivoire under Resolution 1572.208  The 
sanctions include an arms embargo,209  a travel ban,210  an assets freeze,211  and diamond 
sanctions.212 
The Security Council has modified and renewed the sanctions by subsequent resolutions like 
Resolutions 1584213 and 1643.214 Most recently, the Council extended the sanctions under 
Resolution 1727215 from 2006. The Security Council is scheduled to review the sanctions in 
light of the progress achieved in the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire by 
31 October 2007.216 
Based upon paragraph 8 of Resolution 1572, the arms embargo does not apply to supplies 
and technical assistance for the support of or use by the United Nations Operation in Côte 
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d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the French forces,217 as well as to supplies of protective clothing exported 
to Côte d’Ivoire by UN personnel, media representatives, humanitarian and development 
workers, for their personal use.218  
In addition, in paragraph 12 of Resolution 1727, the Security Council emphasized that it is 
fully prepared to impose targeted measures against persons who are responsible for serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, for inciting public hatred and 
violating the arms embargo, as well as for attacking or obstructing the actions of UNOCI, the 
French forces, the High Representative for the Elections, the International Working Group, or the 
Mediators.219 
 
 3.2.10. Sanctions against the Sudan 
The most recent case of the Security Council imposing economic sanctions against gross 
human rights violations is the one against the Sudan.  
By imposing sanctions, including an arms embargo on all non-governmental entities and 
individuals, including the Janjaweed militias, under Resolution 1556 in 2004, the Security 
Council clearly showed its concern. It justified its actions against human rights violation as 
follows:  
Reiterating its grave concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights 
violations, including continued attacks on civilians that are placing the lives of hundreds of 
thousands at risk,  
Condemning all acts of violence and violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law by all parties to the crisis, in particular by the Janjaweed, including indiscriminate attacks on 
civilians, rapes, forced displacements, and acts of violence especially those with an ethnic 
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dimension, and expressing its utmost concern at the consequences of the conflict in Darfur on the 
civilian population, including women, children, internally displaced persons, and refugees, 
Recalling in this regard that the Government of Sudan bears the primary responsibility to respect 
human rights while maintaining law and order and protecting its population within its territory and 
that all parties are obliged to respect international humanitarian law,  
Urging all the parties to take the necessary steps to prevent and put an end to violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law and underlining that there will be no impunity for 
violators, 
Expressing its determination to do everything possible to halt a humanitarian catastrophe,         
including by taking further action if required…220 (emphasis added) 
The sanctions were modified and strengthened with the adoption of Resolution 1591221 in 
2005, which expanded the scope of the arms embargo222 and imposed additional measures 
including a travel ban223 and an assets freeze224 on individuals designated by the Security 
Council Sanctions Committee.  
However, the list of individuals who are subject to the sanctions imposed by these 
resolutions is too limited. Currently, there are only four persons listed.225  
The Security Council clearly expressed its intention to consider taking strong and effective 
measures against “any individual or group that violates or attempts to block the implementation 
of the Darfur Peace Agreement” in paragraph 1 of Resolution 1679,226 though any further 
measures have not been enforced yet. 
Human Rights Watch has also asked the Security Council, especially China, to seriously 
consider “the important step of supporting through the UN the imposition of targeted sanctions 
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on key Sudanese officials responsible for Darfur policy.”227 
 
 3.2.11. Effects of the U.N. Security Council Economic Sanctions 
All ten cases discussed above were provided as samples to illustrate the idea that the 
Security Council economic sanctions bolster fundamental human rights. In each case, it was 
quite clear that the sanctions mentioned in the text of the resolutions are against the gross human 
rights violations codified in international law including the U.N. Charter. If all Security Council 
resolutions which imposed the sanctions against human rights violations were examined, they 
would also support this conclusion.   
Therefore, this paper argues that the sanctions by the Security Council have at least some 
positive effects on international human rights law and that they build international human rights 
norms. 
However, it is also undeniable that for many years, the Security Council, while having the 
power under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to adopt legally binding resolutions and to order 
enforcement measures including economic sanctions, has rarely agreed to take such measures in 
the past. That situation changed to a large extent with the end of the Cold War. As discussed 
above, with increasing frequency, the Security Council has since exercised its powers under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in cases of gross human rights violations.  
This development has led to the growing willingness of the international community and 
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individual states to deal with gross human rights violations by one effective tool of modern 
international law, economic sanctions. 
 
3.3. Economic Sanctions by the U.S. 
The United States has applied economic sanctions against target countries for various 
purposes. To protect and promote human rights, the United States imposed economic sanctions 
against China after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989.228 In 2007, President Bush 
announced that the U.S. government was ready to impose sanctions, including economic ones, 
against the Sudan for failing to cooperate with international efforts to end what he described as 
the "genocide" in the Darfur region. However, the U.S. postponed its sanctions to give the U.N. 
Secretary General time to seek diplomatic solutions to the crisis.229  
In response to various nationalization movements, the U.S. has actively applied economic 
sanctions since the 1950s.230 By 1976, the U.S. had imposed such sanctions on Brazil, Chile, 
Cuba, Ethiopia, and Iran.231  
To keep the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear 
weapons, the U.S. imposed numerous sanctions including economic measures on countries 
attempting to acquire WMD and related materials.232 Most notably, the U.S. applied financial 
measures on North Korea to prevent the construction of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant without 
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the supervision of IAEA.233 In addition, the U.S. imposed restrictions on shipments of nuclear 
fuel to Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and Taiwan throughout the 1970s and 
1980s.234  
The U.S. has used economic sanctions to protect the environment, as well. In the 1990s, the 
U.S. government included environmental conservation in its list of foreign policy priorities by 
including environmental protection in the definition of national security.235 As a result, the U.S. 
has enacted various sanctions, including economic measures that prohibit Ex-Im Bank export 
financing on products to be used in the construction of China's controversial Three Gorges Dam 
Project, or measures that prohibit the import of shrimp from countries that fail to protect sea 
turtle in their shrimp nets.236 The U.S. has also banned the importation of various fish and 
wildlife from Taiwan.237  
Lastly, to prevent terrorism, since the early 1980s the U.S. has imposed sanctions on 
countries that are suspected of having terror links. For example, in the case of Libya, the U.S. 
banned imports of Libyan oil and a number of exports to Libya, following the deterioration in bi-
lateral relations in 1982. In 1992, after the bombing of the Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
the U.S. government imposed unilateral sanctions on Lybia. It lifted most of its economic 
sanctions and restored its diplomatic ties after Libya publicly turned its back on weapons of mass 
destruction. However, Libya still remains on the list of state sponsors of terrorism and as a result, 
arms exports are still banned by the U.S. government.238 
There are broadly three rationales underpinning economic sanctions for the achievement of 
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these purposes.239 First, imposing economic sanctions seeks to influence a targeted state to 
change its policies or even its government actions.240 Second, it publicly expresses an opposition 
against the targeted state’s policies to the people in the targeted state as well as the international 
community including other potential target states.241 Third, it aims to punish the targeted state 
for its policies.242 
Generally, the U.S. can impose economic sanctions on other countries on the following three 
grounds. First, under the federal statutes or executive orders by the President, the Executive can 
have the power to impose economic sanctions.243 Second, the Legislative can impose sanctions 
by legislation.244  Third, following a U.N. Security Council resolution, the U.S. can take 
sanctions including economic measures to meet the requirements of the resolution.245 
 
 3.3.1. U.S. Statutes on Sanctions against Human Rights Violations 
The U.S. Congress has adopted a number of statutes in an effort to assimilate U.S. foreign 
policy into the protection and promotion of international human rights norms.246 The most 
notable federal statute which became the foundation of these legislative efforts is Section 502B 
of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961.247 It states: 
(1) The United States shall, in accordance with its international obligations as set forth in the 
Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the 
United States, promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental 
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freedoms throughout the world without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
Accordingly, a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote the 
increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries.248 
(2) ..... [n]o security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in 
a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.249 
Concerning development assistance, the U.S. implemented this policy under Section 116 of 
FAA of 1961:250  
(a) Violations barring assistance; assistance for needy people 
No assistance may be provided ..... [t]o the government of any country which engages in a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture 
or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, 
causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, 
or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance 
will directly benefit the needy people in such country.251 
Section 502 of the Trade Act of 1974252 also authorized the withholding of development 
assistance and trade benefits from states violating the following policy: 
(c) Factors affecting country designation 
In determining whether to designate any country as a beneficiary developing country under this 
subchapter, the President shall take into account: 
(7) whether or not such country has taken or is taking steps to afford to workers in that country 
(including any designated zone in that country) internationally recognized worker rights.253 
Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977254 was adopted to direct 
the U.S. government to use its “voice and vote” in numerous international financial institutions 
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including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pursuant to the policy as stated below: 
(a) Policy goals 
The United States Government, in connection with its voice and vote in the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the International 
Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Fund, the 
Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, and the International Monetary Fund, shall advance the cause of human rights, 
including by seeking to channel assistance toward countries other than those whose governments 
engage in: 
(1) a pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, such as torture or cruel, 
inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other 
flagrant denial to life, liberty, and the security of person; or 
(2) provide refuge to individuals committing acts of international terrorism by hijacking aircraft.255 
While the human rights protected by U.S. sanctions vary from statute to statute, these rights 
are generally in accord with the fundamental human rights recognized by international law.256 
Therefore, Section 116 of the FAA of 1961,257 one of the foundational statutes preventing 
development assistance to states with human rights violations, defines recognized human rights 
as follows: 
.....torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without 
charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those 
persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person.....258 
In 1990, this act was amended in paragraph (b) to protect the rights of children from 
exploitation. It states: 
(b) Protection of children from exploitation 
No assistance may be provided to any government failing to take appropriate and adequate 
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measures, within their means, to protect children from exploitation, abuse or forced conscription 
into military or paramilitary services.259 
In addition, in 1998, this Act was amended in paragraph (c) to protect the right of religious 
freedom, as well: 
(c) Factors considered 
In determining whether or not a government falls within the provisions of subsection (a) of this 
section..... the Administrator shall consider..... 
3) whether the government 
(A) has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined in 
section 6402260 of this title;261 
Though the listed rights in Section 116 of FAA did not explicitly include such generally 
recognized Jus Cogens norms as genocide or crimes against humanity, it seems that the U.S. 
Congress did not intend to exclude them.262  
It is very difficult to compile and categorize all U.S. statutes and regulations including 
annexed options for imposing economic sanctions against gross human rights violations. 
However, this paper believes that the U.S. has made an effort to adopt and amend a series of 
statutes that incorporate the protection of international human rights into U.S. foreign policy 
including imposing economic sanctions. The followings are cases of economic sanctions by the 
U.S. government at least partially imposed for human rights violations. 
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 3.3.2. Sanctions against Poland 
In December 1981, the Polish government declared martial law, under which the army and 
the special police arrested or detained all Solidarity Labor Union leaders and many affiliated 
intellectuals.263 The United States and other Western countries responded to the martial law by 
imposing economic sanctions against the Polish government.  
President Ronald Reagan stated that the purpose of imposing economic sanction is to 
persuade the Polish leaders to “free those in arbitrary detention, to lift martial law, and to restore 
the internationally recognized rights of the Polish people to free speech and association.”264 
Though it was not mentioned in the U.S. sanctions legislation, the Polish government also 
violated the fundamental economic rights of the Polish people “to form free trade unions and to 
strike” by the illegalization of the Solidarity Labor Union.265  
These human rights are in accordance with the rights protected by international human rights 
law. For example, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)266 states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.” Article 22 of 
ICCPR states: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the 
right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”  
Overall, these economic sanctions against Poland reinforced international human rights 
norms. Based upon the sanctions, the U.S. government denied providing 765 million dollars in 
agricultural assistance to Poland and also withdrew its most-favored-nation status.267 It was a 
tough sanction considering the fact that the Polish foreign debt was more than $20 billion in 
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1980.268 However, these sanctions were gradually terminated in return for various positive steps 
by the Polish government from the release of political prisoners to the formal abolition of martial 
law in 1981.269 
 
 3.3.3. Sanctions against South Africa 
In 1985 the administration of Ronald Reagan imposed limited sanctions against South 
Africa for its government’s racial restrictions and apartheid. 270  In 1986, Congress, after 
overriding a presidential veto, imposed more comprehensive economic sanctions to ban the 
import of South African goods and investments in South Africa271 through the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986.272 Under Section 311 of the CAAA, the U.S. stipulated 
the conditions for termination of the sanctions as follows:  
(a) This title and sections ..... shall terminate if the Government of South Africa: 
(1) releases all persons persecuted for their political beliefs or detained unduly without trial and 
Nelson Mandela from prison; 
(2) repeals the state of emergency in effect on the date of enactment of this Act and releases all 
detainees held under such state of emergency; 
(3) unbans democratic political parties and permits the free exercise by South Africans of all races 
of the right to form political parties, express political opinions, and otherwise participate in the 
political process; 
(4) repeals the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act and institutes no other 
measures with the same purposes; and 
(5) agrees to enter into good faith negotiations with truly representative members of the black 
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majority without preconditions.273 
The release of all political prisoners and those detained without trial is addressed mainly in 
Article 9 of the ICCPR.274 The right to express political opinions is found in Article 19(2) of the 
ICCPR.275 The repeal of all discriminatory measures is in Article 2(1) of the ICCPR.276 Overall, 
the rights protected by this Act through the imposition of sanctions against South Africa 
correspond to the international human rights norms. 
The effects of economic sanctions are, however, subject to criticism. The sanctions against 
South Africa allegedly caused the loss of more than 100,000 jobs.277 Economic sanctions are 
also criticized for pushing “already vulnerable populations..... over the edge into deeper 
suffering.”278 Despite some criticisms, economic sanctions remained firmly in place. 
In 1990, Nelson Mandela was, finally, released after twenty-seven years of imprisonment, 
and the South African government amended most of the apartheid laws and extended political 
rights to black people. The U.S. government lifted the economic sanctions, concluding that South 
Africa has met the five conditions in the CAAA279 and the purpose of the sanctions was 
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successfully accomplished.280 
 
 3.3.4. Sanctions against Iraq 
On August 2, 1990, the U.S. enacted the Iraq Sanctions Act (ISA) of 1990 to impose 
economic sanctions on Iraq, including a comprehensive trade ban and a prohibition of financial 
relationships with the country for its invasion of Kuwait.281 As discussed in Chapter III.2.B., the 
U.N. also imposed economic sanctions against Iraq under Security Council Resolution 661 
calling upon all member states to take trade and financial sanctions against Iraq.282 The U.S. and 
the U.N. sanctions shared the same objective.  
Furthermore, through the ISA, the U.S. emphasized its purpose to protect human rights by 
stipulating that the U.S. Congress “condemns the brutal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and its 
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in Kuwait, including widespread 
arrests, torture, summary executions, and mass extrajudicial killings.”283 
Prohibition of torture is found not only in the Torture Convention284 but also in Article 7 of 
the ICCPR.285 The summary executions and mass extrajudicial killings are addressed in Articles 
6(1)286  and 14(1)287 of the ICCPR. Overall, the rights protected by this act through the 
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imposition of sanctions against Iraq correspond to the international human rights norms. 
The U.S. sanctions against Iraq have been widely criticized for “their disproportions impact 
on the Iraqi population at large.”288 While there were many reports and warnings about lack of 
food and medicine, economic sanctions remained firmly in place.289 Finally, after the Iraq War 
in 2003 (the second Gulf War) with the subversion of the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein, 
the U.S. lifted its sanctions against Iraq. 
 
 3.3.5. Sanctions against Haiti 
In 1990, Haiti held its first free and fair elections in its history.290 However, in 1991, a 
military coup ousted the constitutional government.291  The U.S. government called for a 
restoration of democracy with the support of the Organization of American States (OAS). And 
the U.S. imposed economic sanctions including a trade embargo on all goods except food and 
medicine.292 The aim of the sanctions was “to put pressure on the leaders of the coup and to 
deter any other coups from taking place.”293  
After the U.S. presidential election, the U.S. government strengthened the sanctions to 
further pressure the Haitian military government to step down and to protect the human rights of 
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the Haitians including the return of refugees to Haiti.294 The Haitian military government 
“unleashed a campaign of terror and repression.....including extrajudicial execution, 
disappearances, torture, rape, limitations on freedom of association and assembly, and disruption 
in personal and professional activities.”295  
The majority of the named offenses clearly implicate fundamental human rights codified in 
international human rights law, and concern for international human rights became an impetus 
for the U.S. government to impose sanctions against Haiti. 
In 1994, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 940, which authorized the use of “all 
necessary means” to remove the military government and to restore Haiti's constitutionally 
elected government to power.296 With this resolution the Council expressed its grave concerns 
about “the significant further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Haiti, in particular the 
continuing escalation by the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties.”297  
While a multinational force (MNF) led by the U.S. prepared to enter Haiti based upon 
Security Council Resolution 940, the rule of the military government ended and the 
constitutional government restored its power.298 President Aristide and other elected officials in 
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exile returned on October 15 1994, and all the sanctions were lifted after that.299 
During the time when the sanctions were in effect, the U.S. maintained its humanitarian 
assistance by funding non-governmental organizations in Haiti to ease the growing pains of the 
Haitian people due to the shortage of food and medical supplies.300 
 
 3.3.6. Sanctions against Burma 
Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, has a grim human rights record. There are numerous 
reports of gross human rights violations by the Burmese military government, such as apartheid, 
forced labor and drug trafficking.301 Millions of ethnic minorities in Burma have fled from 
economic and political oppression to Bangladesh, India, China, Malaysia and Thailand to seek 
asylum. More than 170,000 Burmese live in nine refugee camps in Thailand and two in 
Bangladesh.302 
Burma has become the object of international reproach since 1988 when the Burmese 
military junta seized power. This military government formed the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC)303 after a bloody crackdown on a series of democratic movements 
led by students. The SLORC nullified the results of the national election in 1990 and arbitrarily 
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detained democracy activists including their leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.304 While Burma is a 
member state of a number of major human rights treaties,305 including the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child,306 the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women,307  the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 308  and the 
Genocide Convention,309 the Burmese military government has violated fundamental human 
rights norms regarding arbitrary detention, torture, extrajudicial execution, forced child labor, 
and coercive relocation of minorities, for more than 10 years.310 
Following the Free Burma Act of 1995, the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 1996, 
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 1997, and Executive Order 13047 in 1997,311 in 2003, 
the U.S. government imposed new economic sanctions against Burma.312 Other countries and 
international organizations joined the U.S. by imposing sanctions against the gross human rights 
violations by the Burmese military junta.313 These include the condemnation by U.N. bodies, 
monitoring by international organizations and NGOs, severance of diplomatic relations, bans on 
foreign assistance, and the prevention of investment in Burma.314  
Through the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, the U.S. government 
condemned the Burmese military government as follows.  
(1) The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has failed to transfer power to the National 
League for Democracy (NLD) whose parliamentarians won an overwhelming victory in the 1990 
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elections in Burma.  
(4) .....the SPDC ..... brutally attacked NLD supporters, killed and injured scores of civilians, and 
arrested democracy advocate Aung San Suu Kyi and other activists.  
(5) The SPDC continues egregious human rights violations against Burmese citizens, uses rape as a 
weapon of intimidation and torture against women, and forcibly conscripts child-soldiers for the use 
in fighting indigenous ethnic groups. 
(6) The SPDC is engaged in ethnic cleansing against minorities within Burma.....which constitutes a 
crime against humanity and has directly led to more than 600,000 internally displaced people living 
within Burma and more than 130,000 people from Burma living in refugee camps along the Thai-
Burma border.315 
Under this Act, the U.S. government stressed that sanctions against Burma will not be lifted 
until it meets the following conditions:  
(B) The SPDC has made measurable and substantial progress toward implementing a democratic 
government including 
(i) releasing all political prisoners; 
(ii) allowing freedom of speech and the press; 
(iii) allowing freedom of association; 
(iv) permitting the peaceful exercise of religion; and 
(v) bringing to a conclusion an agreement between the SPDC and the democratic forces led by the 
NLD and Burma's ethnic nationalities on the transfer of power to a civilian government accountable 
to the Burmese people through democratic elections under the rule of law.316 
Most of the conditions listed in the text of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 
2003 correspond to international human rights law. Arrests of democracy advocates and their 
arbitrary detention, as well as that of other political prisoners, are directly linked with liberty-
rights stipulated in Article 9 through 15 of the ICCPR.317 In addition, Article 8(3) of the ICCPR 
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prohibits "forced or compulsory labour,"318 Article 7 prevents torture,319 and Article 18 protects 
freedom of thought and religion.320 All of these articles of the ICCPR and most of the major 
international human rights treaties are in accord with the human rights violations listed in this 
U.S. Act of 2003. 
There have been, however, criticisms of the sanctions for their negative effects. 321 For 
example, The New York Times reported that the sanctions caused the loss of more than 400,000 
jobs in the textile industry of Burma and most of the women who lost their jobs have been forced 
to become prostitutes.322 
In response to the U.S. sanctions since 1995, the Burmese military government has taken “a 
number of modest but significant steps.”323 It released Aung San Suu Kyi, the pro-democracy 
leader of the political opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), from her six-
year house arrest in 1995, though her rights to travel and meet other democracy advocates were 
restricted.324 In the late 1990s, the use of forced labor declined due to the Burmese government’s 
replacement of man power by machinery.325 In 1999, the Burmese government permitted the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to reopen its office in the capital of Burma and to visit 
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Burmese prisons on a regular basis.326 Since October 2000, the Burmese military government 
had engaged Aung San Suu Kyi, the head of the NLD, in peace talks for a political settlement in 
Burma.327 On July 27, 2000, the government reopened most universities which had been closed 
since 1996.328 In addition, the Burmese military government periodically released small groups 
of political prisoners and 182 of them had been freed by November 2002.329 Overall, the U.S. 
economic sanctions against Burma and its support for the Burmese democracy movement have 
played an essential role in promoting change in Burma. There are still strong criticisms on the 
effect of the U.S. sanctions against Burma.330 However, this paper believes that the refusal of 
China and ASEAN to support the U.S. sanctions should be the main target of such criticisms 
because Burmese economy is heavily dependent on the export of natural resources like natural 
gas to those countries.  
 
 3.3.7. Effect of U.S. Economic Sanctions  
All five cases reviewed above illustrate the idea that the U.S. economic sanctions reinforce 
fundamental human rights. In each case, it is quite clear that the sanctions stipulated in the text of 
the legislations are against the gross human rights violations recognized in international law, 
including the U.N. Charter.  
Therefore, this paper argues that the sanctions by the U.S. government have at least some 
positive effects on international human rights law. Undoubtedly, these economic sanctions had 
some negative effects on the targeted states. In numerous reports and articles, scholars and 
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human rights advocates have constantly argued that economic sanctions hurt large numbers of 
innocent civilians in the targeted states not only by limiting the availability of food and medicine, 
but also by disrupting the whole economy, depriving civilians of essential income, and reducing 
the national capacity of water treatment, electrical systems and other infrastructure critical for 
health and life.331 
However, the cases discussed above demonstrate that the U.S. economic sanctions have 
played an important role in “broadening and deepening the global response” to the human rights 
crisis in the targeted states.332 They also show that the sanctions induced the targeted states to 
accept international treaty obligations including human rights norms and modestly change their 
human rights policies. In most of the cases, ultimately the targeted state entered into a 
comprehensive agreement including the protection of human rights with the international 
community in order to have the sanctions lifted.  
Economic sanctions cannot be a sole cause of civilian suffering in targeted states. The 
targeted states should bear the heavy burden of responsibility for people’s suffering. It is 
undeniable that economic sanctions have inherent flaws. However, they should not object 
sanctions because of these flaws and negative effects. The problem is not in the sanctions 
themselves, but in their effect. Therefore, the criticism on economic sanctions should focus on 
finding a way to decrease their negative effects, rather than on arguing for not imposing them 
without providing a better alternative. 
Overall, the U.S. economic sanctions have been part of a collective effort by the 
international community to develop current human rights norms and to protect and promote 
fundamental human rights in the targeted states. 
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3.4. Economic Sanctions by the E.U. 
 3.4.1. General Perspective 
The European Union established one of the most effective international systems for the 
protection of human rights333 and has imposed economic sanctions against gross human rights 
violation.  
In recent years, the E.U. has frequently imposed sanctions334 following its own basic law or 
the UN Security Council resolutions. The E.U. imposes sanctions for the specific objectives of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). These objectives are stipulated in Article 11 
of the Treaty on European Union. It states:  
1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of 
foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:  
— to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union 
in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter, 
— to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, 
— to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the 
Paris Charter, including those on external borders,  
— to promote international cooperation, 
— to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms 335 (emphasis added). 
Respect for human rights and fundamental freedom is one of the objectives clearly 
prescribed in the Treaty. Thus, sanctions against gross human rights violations are recognized as 
lawful measures by the E.U. In addition, as the U.N Charter confers power on the Security 
Council to impose sanctions through its resolutions in order to restore international peace and 
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security,336 the E.U. implements sanctions imposed by the Security Council resolutions not only 
based upon the U.N. Charter, but also pursuant to the Treaty on European Union. 
In 2004, in order to develop a policy framework for more effective use of sanctions, the 
Political and Security Committee under the Council of the European Union prepared a draft of 
the Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions). Selected paragraphs of this 
draft are cited below: 
1. We are committed to the effective use of sanctions as an important way to maintain and restore 
international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and of our 
common foreign and security policy. In this context, the Council will work continuously to support 
the UN and fulfil our obligations under the UN Charter. 
3. If necessary, the Council will impose autonomous EU sanctions in support of efforts to fight 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and as a restrictive measure to 
uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. We will do this 
in accordance with our common foreign and security policy, as set out in Article 11 TEU, and in full 
conformity with our obligations under international law. 
4. The Council will work to enlist the support of the widest possible range of partners in support of 
EU autonomous sanctions which will be more effective when they are reinforced by broad 
international support. 
6. Sanctions should be targeted in a way that has maximum impact on those whose behaviour we 
want to influence. Targeting should reduce to the maximum extent possible any adverse 
humanitarian effects or unintended consequences for persons not targeted or neighbouring 
countries. Measures, such as arms embargoes, visa bans and the freezing of funds are a way of 
achieving this. 337 
To impose sanctions not by an individual member state, but by the E.U. itself, a Common 
Position should be adopted under Article 15 of the Treaty establishing the European Union.338 
As an instrument of the CFSP for the imposition of sanctions, the adoption of a new Common 
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Position requires unanimity from E.U. Member States in Council.339 If the Common Position 
provides for imposing sanctions against targeted states, Article 301340 and 60341 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community is applied.  
In some cases, it is possible to implement economic sanctions through a CFSP legal 
instrument and a pre-existing Regulation. Currently, there are two pre-existing regulations which 
are closely related to the sanctions against gross human rights violations. The first one is Council 
Regulation 2368 of 2002.342 It aims to control the trade of rough diamonds due to the deep 
concerns about “the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on 
the peace, safety and security of people in affected countries and the systematic and gross human 
rights violations that have been perpetrated in such conflicts.”343 This regulation is also related 
to the Kimberley Process, which was established in 2002 as an international forum to control the 
trade in rough diamonds.344 The second one is Council Regulation 1236 of 2005.345 This 
regulation prohibits the export from or import to the E.U. of certain goods which can be used for 
capital punishment, torture or other cruel and inhuman treatment. 
Economic sanctions imposed by the E.U. include arms embargos, specific or general import 
and export bans, restrictions on financial assistance, travel bans and other appropriate measures. 
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The arms embargo applies to the items listed in the E.U. Common Military List.346 It may 
be extended to related financial and technical assistance, and to items which may be used for 
internal repression which in many cases is considered a human rights violation. In addition, in 
the case of an arms embargo, Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
allows member states to use their domestic measures for an embargo of military related goods.347 
Thus, an arms embargo is imposed by a Common Position of the E.U., and implemented 
pursuant to the national legislation of the member states. 
 
 3.4.2. Sanctions adopted by the E.U. 
The following are cases of economic sanctions imposed by the E.U. at least partially for 
human rights violations. 
  3.4.2.1. Sanctions against Belarus  
The Council of the E.U. adopted Common Position 2004/661/CFSP to impose sanctions348 
against the Belarusian government349 for the enforced disappearances of three pro-democracy 
persons in 1999 and one well-known journalist in 2000.  
In 2004, in response to the fraudulent elections and a series of gross human rights violations 
by the Belarusian government during the repression of peaceful demonstrations in the aftermath 
of the elections, the E.U. adopted Common Position 2004/848/CFSP to strengthen and expand 
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the sanctions against Belarus by amending its previous Common Position.350  
In 2006, the Belarusian government arbitrarily arrested more than 500 people who had 
exercised their right of free assembly to protest the fraudulent presidential elections on 19 March 
2006.351 The Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded 
that the presidential election in 2006 was severely flawed and fell significantly short of Belarus' 
OSCE commitments.352 Based upon this final report of ODIHR, the E.U. consequently adopted 
Common Position 2006/276/CFSP to impose sanctions against the Belarusian government 
including President Lukashenko for “the violation of international electoral standards and the 
crackdown on civil society and democratic opposition.”353 The economic sanctions included a 
travel ban and an assets freeze. In May 2006, Council Regulation 765/2006 was adopted to 
enforce Common Position 2006/276/CFSP.354 
 
  3.4.2.2. Sanctions against Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)  
In 2003, the E.U. adopted Common Position 2003/680/CFSP in order to implement Security 
Council Resolution 1493355 which imposed an arms embargo against the DRC.356 In 2005, 
Common Position 2005/440/CFSP was adopted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1596357 
which strengthened the sanctions against the DRC including a freeze of all funds, financial assets 
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and economic resources and a travel ban.358 Based upon this Common Position, the E.U. 
adopted Council Regulations 889/2005359 and 1183/2005360 to enforce such sanctions. 
 
  3.4.2.3. Sanctions against Côte d’Ivoire  
In 2004 and 2006, the E.U. Council adopted Common Position 2004/852/CFSP and 2006/30 
/CFSP pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1572361 and 1643.362 363 Based upon the 
resolutions, economic sanctions including “embargo on arms and related materiel, ban on exports 
of equipment for internal repression, ban on certain services, restrictions on admission, freezing 
of funds and economic resources of certain persons who constitute a threat to the peace and 
national reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire, and import ban on diamonds” were imposed by 
the Common Position.364 Then, to enforce this Common Position, the E.U. legislated Council 
Regulations 174/2005365 and 560/2005.366 
 
  3.4.2.4. Sanctions against Haiti  
On June 2, 1994, Common Position 94/315/CFSP367 was adopted in accordance with 
Security Council Resolutions 917, 841, 873, and 875. Specifically pursuant to paragraph 4 of 
Resolution 917,368 the E.U. decided to reduce its economic relations with Haiti and to impose 
necessary sanctions to freeze the funds and financial resources of the Haitian military 
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government under this Common Position.369 Council Regulation 1264/1994 was also adopted 
under this Common Position on the same day.370 
 
  3.4.2.5. Sanctions against Burma  
In 1996 the E.U. adopted Common Position 96/635/CFSP to impose sanctions against 
Burma371 for the continuing human rights violations by the Burmese military government,372 
including detention of pro-democracy advocates, forced labor, torture and oppression of the 
freedom of religion and speech. These included “arms embargo, ban on exports of equipment for 
internal repression, freezing of funds and economic resources, restrictions on admission, ban on 
financing of Burmese state-owned companies, suspension of certain aid and development 
programs, suspension of high level bilateral governmental visits and reduction of diplomatic 
relations.”373  
The sanctions imposed by Common Position 96/635/CFSP were replaced and renewed 
subsequently by the adoption of Common Position 2003/297/CFSP in 2003, Common Position 
2004/423/CFSP in 2004, and Common Position 2006/318/CFSP in 2006.374 
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(3) In view of the current political situation in Burma/ Myanmar, as witnessed by:   
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- the continuing detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, other members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and 
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governmental organizations,  
the Council considers it fully justified to maintain the restrictive measures against the military regime in 
 - 68 - 
 
  3.4.2.6. Sanctions against the Sudan 
In January 2004, the E.U. adopted Common Position 2004/31/CFSP concerning the 
imposition of an embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment for the Sudan375 to 
promote peace and reconciliation within the country. In 2005, pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1556 of 2004376 and Resolution 1591 of 2005377, the E.U. adopted Common Position 
2005/411/CFSP to extend its sanctions against the Sudan.378  
These comprehensive sanctions comprise “[r]estrictions on admission of persons who 
infringe UN arms embargo or human rights, prohibition to grant, sell, supply or transfer technical 
assistance and to provide financing or financial assistance related to military activities, freezing 
of funds and economic resources of persons who infringe UN arms embargo or human rights, 
and embargo on arms and related materials,” under Common Position 2005/411/CFSP.379  
 
  3.4.2.7. Sanctions against Zimbabwe  
Following the huge frustration of the 2000 national referendum to change the constitution, 
the human rights situation in Zimbabwe has been of grave concern to the international 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Burma/Myanmar, those who benefit most from its misrule, and those who actively frustrate the process of national 
reconciliation, respect for human rights and democracy. 
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community.380 The Zimbabwean government has persecuted the supporters of the political 
opposition and human rights advocates, with the objective of eliminating any dissent against the 
government policies.381 Human rights violations by the Zimbabwean government have steadily 
increased in the form of “state-sponsored intimidation, arbitrary arrest, torture and attacks on 
human rights defenders.” 382  Furthermore, the government’s repression has caused severe 
economic decline and food shortage.383  
In 2002, the E.U. adopted Common Position 2002/145/CFSP to impose sanctions against 
Zimbabwe, including an arms embargo, prohibition of related technical training or assistance, 
freezing of government funds, and travel bans.384 Because of the aggravated human rights 
situation in Zimbabwe, the E.U. decided to extend and strengthen the sanctions against the 
Zimbabwean government, which “bear[s] a wide responsibility for serious violations of human 
rights and of the freedom of opinion, of association and of peaceful assembly.”385 Common 
Position 2002/145/CFSP was amended and renewed by Common Position 2002/600/CFSP of 
2002,386 Common Position 2003/115/CFSP of 2003,387 and Common Position 2004/161/CFSP 
of 2004.388  
With its Common Position, the E.U. clearly indicated that the objective of these sanctions is 
“to reject policies that lead to the suppression of human rights, of the freedom of expression and 
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of good governance.”389 The current sanctions will be valid until February 20, 2008.390 
 
 3.4.3. Targeted Sanctions 
As discussed in Chapter III. 2 and 3 of this paper, the criticism against the sanctions by the 
Security Council and the U.S. also applies to the sanctions imposed by the E.U.  
Therefore, to reduce the negative impact of broad economic sanctions on civilian 
populations in the targeted states, the E.U. has actively discussed a way of mitigating any 
negative humanitarian impact of economic sanctions.  
These are known as targeted or smart sanctions as stipulated in the project paper on E.U. 
Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures391 adopted by the 
Council of the European Union. In 2003, the Council adopted Guidelines on Implementation and 
Evaluation of Restrictive Measures in the Framework of the CFSP.392 Based upon them, in 
February 2004, the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party was established to develop 
more effective and well-designed implementation of the sanctions. 393  This Council body 
proposed a detailed and thoughtful draft on this wide-ranging subject and subsequently, the 
Council adopted this project paper in December 2005.394 
While they are not legally binding for the E.U. and its member states, these guidelines were 
adopted by the Council with the intention of using them to impose future sanctions. Targeted 
sanctions include “financial, travel, aviation, arms and commodities restrictions on individuals 
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or corporate entities with the objective of applying coercive pressure on transgressing parties, 
leaders and the network of elites and entities who support them.”395 (emphasis added.) 
The guidelines provide clear criteria for the purposes of determining who should be listed 
and who should be not listed where individuals or specific entities are subject to targeted 
sanctions.396 They also present specific conditions and procedures for exemptions from the 
sanctions.397 For example, in connection to humanitarian exemptions, paragraph 55 states: 
55. While acting consistently with the letter and spirit of the Regulations, the competent authority 
shall take into account fundamental rights when granting exemptions to cover basic needs.398 
Many individual member states of the E.U. have also worked on this project.399
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IV. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER THE 
WTO SYSTEM 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) deals with the rules of trade between nations at the 
international level. Its foremost goal is “free trade.” To achieve this goal, the WTO trade system 
tries to eliminate almost all types of trade barriers by individual member states which can 
undermine trade liberalization.400  
This is clearly stipulated in Article I: General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment,401 and 
Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation, 402  of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947: hereafter GATT). 
On the other hand, under certain conditions, the GATT allows exceptions from the general 
agreement, as stipulated in Article XX: General Exceptions403  and Article XXI: Security 
Exceptions.404  
This Chapter will argue that while economic sanctions are in principle contrary to the free 
trade provisions of the GATT, economic sanctions against gross human rights violations are 
allowed under the exceptional provisions of the GATT in the WTO system. 
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4.1. Free Trade Provisions of the GATT 
Article I and Article III require a Most-Favoured-Nations Treatment (MFN) and a National 
Treatment (NT) in the trade policy of the individual member states. Each provision states:  
Article I: General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with 
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or 
exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all 
rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and ..... [a]ny advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like 
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.  
Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation 
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products..... 
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products 
of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.....405 
As stated above, these free trade provisions require member states respectively to give equal 
market access to “like” products from all other GATT member states, and prohibit any 
discrimination between domestic products of member states and “like” products of other member 
states. In addition, the member states of the GATT can refuse MFN or NT only for the reasons 
expressly mentioned in the GATT. Otherwise, member states cannot impose conditions on MFN 
or NT like the targeted state’s compliance with international human rights law. For example, the 
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U.S. withdrawal of MFN from Poland in 1980s406 would have been a violation of the GATT, if 
Poland had objected.  
Furthermore, Article XI prohibits each member state of the GATT from imposing so-called 
Non-Tariff Barriers to its own trade policies for import. This provision states:  
Article XI: General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective 
through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by 
any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting 
party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other 
contracting party.407 
As stated above, Non-Tariff Barriers include quotas, import or export licensing restrictions 
and embargoes as a form of import restraints.408 As it is worded, Article XI applies to all import 
restrictions “other than duties, taxes or other charges.” The goal of this provision is “to promote 
transparency in the international trading system” by decreasing the possibility of each member 
state using any type of camouflaged Non-Tariff Barriers in its trade.409 
All economic sanctions against gross human rights violations are initially and inherently, a 
violation of these free trade provisions of the GATT because most of them depend on embargoes, 
the barring of the export of goods related to human rights violations to the targeted states, and the 
prohibition of the import of goods from the targeted states. What is more, not all human rights 
violations have direct linkage to international trade: for example, as discussed in Chapter III, the 
use of forced labor in Burma, the subversion of democracy in Haiti, Belarus, and Zimbabwe, 
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torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, and deprivation of religious freedom in most of the targeted 
states. 
 
4.2. Exceptional Provisions of the GATT 
 4.2.1. Article XXI (Security Exceptions) 
In 1949, Czechoslovakia complained against the U.S. for its prevention of certain exports to 
Czechoslovakia.410 The GATT Contracting Parties rejected the Czechoslovakian complaint with 
the following contention: 
..... thought that since the question clearly concerned Article XXI, the United States action would 
seem to be justified because every country must have the last resort on questions relating to its own 
security. On the other hand, the CONTRACTING PARTIES should be cautious not to take any step 
which might have the effect of undermining the General Agreement.411 
As a result, in 1951 the U.S. suspended the MFN status of communist states, including 
Czechoslovakia.412 
In 1985, President Reagan prohibited all trade with Nicaragua on the ground of national 
security pursuant to Article XXI. The U.S. also argued that, “[t]he GATT is not an appropriate 
forum for debating political and security issues.”413 Then, in its report, the GATT panel reached 
the following conclusion:  
.....as it was not authorized to examine the justification for the U.S. invocation of a general 
exception to the obligations under the General Agreement, it could find the United States neither to 
be complying with its obligations under the General Agreement nor to be failing to carry out its 
                                                          
410
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obligations under that Agreement.414 
Because of Nicaragua’s opposition, however, this panel report was not adopted.  
In addition, Sweden and Ghana, respectively, tried to justify trade restrictions based upon 
this article in 1961 and 1975.415 
Article XXI of the GATT contains a general exception to all obligations of the GATT for 
certain measures imposed by a member state in view of the necessity to protect its essential 
security interests. This provision states:  
Article XXI: Security Exceptions 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed  
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests  
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;  
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in 
other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a 
military establishment;  
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or  
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under     
the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.416 (emphasis 
added.) 
While there are three specific situations stipulated in Article XXI(b), the exceptions are “too 
broad to be subject to abuse.”417 Thus, the problem is how to define the scope of Article XXI 
and whether economic sanctions against human rights violations can be applied to this article or 
not. 
Based upon Article XXI(b)(i) and (ii), this paper argues that economic sanctions against 
                                                          
414
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415
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human rights violations in the form of an arms embargo should be justified. Whether a 
prohibition on the import or export of arms and related materials for human rights violation is 
necessary for the protection of essential security interests of the sanctioning state or not is 
unclear. However, as the GATT panel concluded in the Nicaragua case,418 the WTO may have 
jurisdiction in determining whether trade restriction measures are related to “fissionable 
materials or the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war” rather than in determining 
whether there is national security interest or not. Therefore, as long as the sanctioning state 
argues its necessity for the protection of essential security interests, economic sanctions like arms 
embargos can be regarded as legitimate trade restriction measures under Article XXI(b)(i) and 
(ii). 
More controversial is the provision in Article XXI(b)(iii) concerning the economic sanctions 
against human rights violations. The most important issue is how to define “international 
emergencies.” This term is not defined in international law, either. In the Nicaragua case, 
Nicaragua argued that “international emergencies” should be limited to situations that meet the 
conditions for self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.419 Contrary to this position, 
some scholars argue that a state can determine the existence of “international emergencies” by 
itself, based upon its security interests.420  
As reviewed in Chapter III.2, the U.N., especially through the Security Council, has 
increasingly recognized gross human rights violations as a threat to peace and international 
security, in many cases: Rhodesia, Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Sudan. 
                                                          
418
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The U.S. has also increasingly recognized gross human rights violations as national security 
emergencies. For instance, as discussed in Chapter III.3.B, President Clinton described the 
Burmese military government's enormities as “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security and foreign policy of the United States.”421 While it is hard to accept that the Burmese 
military government’s actions constituted an “extraordinary threat” to the U.S. security, it is an 
undeniable fact that the gross human rights violations by the Burmese military government were 
against the international human rights norms and the international community as a whole took 
certain actions including economic sanctions for the promotion and protection of fundamental 
human rights. 
Therefore, this paper argues that based upon such evolving international practice, gross 
human rights violations should be considered international emergencies. Such violations are the 
infringement of Jus Cogens. This paper also argues that this interpretation of Article XXI(b)(iii) 
will enhance the international human rights norms by allowing economic sanctions against gross 
human rights violations. 
 
 4.2.2. Article XX (General Exceptions) 
Another possible approach to make economic sanctions against gross human rights 
violations a legitimate trade restriction measure under the GATT is in Article XX. It states:  
Article XX: General Exceptions  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:  
                                                          
421
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(a) necessary to protect public morals;  
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;422 (emphasis added). 
To be a general exception under the WTO system, economic sanctions against human rights 
violations should satisfy one of this article’s exceptions stipulated from (a) to (j) and its 
substantive condition.423 Moreover, the sanctions should meet the requirement stated in the 
chapeau to this article.424 In the context of Article XX, the Article XX(a) exception for measures 
“necessary to protect public morals,” the Article XX(b) exception for measures “necessary to 
protect human ... life or health,” and the Article XX(e) exception for measures “relating to the 
products of prison labour,” have increased the likelihood of allowing economic sanctions against 
human rights violations. 
The first question to raise is the scope of jurisdiction for Article XX, General Exceptions. 
The Article XX(e) exception clearly recognizes “extraterritorial” jurisdiction by allowing trade 
restriction measures against a foreign state’s prison labor.425 The Article XX(b) exception only 
applies to trade restriction measures for the protection of “human, animal or plant life or health” 
within a member state’s own jurisdiction.426 The Article XX(a) exception has never been the 
subject of interpretation in dispute settlement processes of the WTO and as a result,427 the scope 
of “public morals” can be potentially extended to international human rights concerns, to some 
extent. In the “United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products” case, 
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the WTO construed that Article XX grants some authority for individual states to act against a 
foreign state’s conduct.428 However, it is still a very controversial issue. 
The second question is the scope of human rights implicated in Article XX, General 
Exceptions. In other words, the question is whether fundamental human rights norms can be 
incorporated into the Article XX exceptions or not. 
The Article XX(a) exception on public morals may include slavery, the prevention of racial 
discrimination, the prevention of gender discrimination, the freedom of speech, the freedom of 
assembly, the freedom of religion and possibly democracy. The Article XX(b) exception on 
human life could be understood as crimes against humanity, genocide, summary execution, and 
disappearance. The Article XX(e) exception on prison labor is initially harder to extend. 
However, it can at least be interpreted to allow trade restrictions on products under prison-like 
conditions, e.g. forced labor, including child labor. 
However, there is not much possibility of economic sanctions against human rights 
violations to be accepted under Article XX , General Exceptions, in the WTO system. The reason 
is that the WTO’s strict adherence to both the “necessity” requirement of Article XX (a) and (b), 
and the “proportionality” requirement of the chapeau, hinders the adoption of economic 
sanctions against gross human rights violations.429  These requirements make Article XX, 
General Exceptions, “an unattractive locus” for economic sanctions against human rights 
violations.430 
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4.3. Reconciling International Economic Law with International Human Rights Law 
This paper maintains that the GATT should be interpreted consistently with international 
law. That is, trade restriction measures against gross human rights violations are compatible with 
the GATT. As discussed in Chapter II and III, fundamental human rights violations are no longer 
just the domestic concern of each individual state.  
The evolving of international human rights law for last 60 years has been in two parallel 
directions. First, international human rights norms which are recognized as Jus Cogens provide 
the legality for the international community’s intervention in offending states. Second, the Erga 
Omnes status of international human rights norms shows that every state has an interest in having 
these human rights norms observed by other states. All of these norms authorize economic 
sanctions not only by the international community including the U.N., but also by each 
individual state.  
Overall, while some economic sanctions may conflict with the main goal of the WTO, i.e. 
free trade, economic sanctions against human rights violations do not undermine the WTO 
system itself. Rather, they can be adapted to the WTO’s free trade framework under international 
law.
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V. CONCLUSION 
This paper reviews the role of economic sanctions in international human rights law.  
Chapter II examines the principle of non-intervention and its exceptions in international 
human rights law. The chapter concluded that the relationship between human rights and state 
sovereignty should and can be complementary. The protection and promotion of human rights 
can be enhanced with a respect for state sovereignty. The state should be viewed not as the 
denier of human rights, but as the protector and promoter of the human rights of its nationals. 
The respect for state sovereignty can be realized by protecting the fundamental rights of its 
nationals through national law. In other words, each individual state has a responsibility to 
protect and promote the human rights of its own nationals based upon the principle of 
sovereignty. State sovereignty and independence should serve not as a hurdle to, but as a 
guarantee for the realization of the fundamental human rights of the state’s nationals. Each 
individual state, then, should cooperate with others to carry out their obligations under state 
sovereignty and international human rights law. 
Chapter II also maintains that the concept of human rights has been expanded and the core 
human rights are inalienable and legally enforceable ones. The concept of sovereignty has also 
been developed and one of its tenets is the protection of the state’s nationals’ fundamental rights 
from state interference and the abuse of power by the government. The evolvement of 
international human rights law is one of the most remarkable innovations in modern international 
law. If gross human rights violations, especially those established by the status of Jus Cogens or 
obligations Erga Omnes, are not solved by a state itself, it is no longer solely the problem of this 
state. Therefore, this paper concludes that fundamental human rights have acquired a status of 
universality and the international community should accept this. 
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Chapter III reviews the doctrines and practices of economic sanctions for human rights 
protection by the U.N. Security Council, the U.S., and the E.U. All cases of economic sanctions 
against gross human rights violations discussed, ten by the Security Council, five by the U.S. and 
seven by the E.U., were provided as samples to illustrate the idea that economic sanctions by the 
international community as a whole bolster fundamental human rights. In each case, it was quite 
clear that the sanctions mentioned in the text of the resolutions, legislation and Common 
Positions against gross human rights violations, were codified in international law, including the 
U.N. Charter. If all cases of sanctions against human rights violations were examined, they 
would only further support this conclusion. Therefore, this paper concludes that the sanctions by 
the Security Council, the U.S. and the E.U. have at least some positive effects on international 
human rights law. They build international human rights norms. This development leads to the 
growing willingness of the international community and other individual states to deal with gross 
human rights violations with one effective tool of modern international law, economic sanctions. 
Undeniably, these economic sanctions have had some negative effects on the targeted states. 
In numerous reports and articles, scholars and human rights advocates have constantly argued 
that economic sanctions hurt large numbers of innocent civilians in the targeted states not only 
by limiting the availability of food and medicine, but also by disrupting the whole economy, 
depriving civilians of essential income, and reducing the national capacity for water treatment, 
electrical systems and other infrastructure critical for health and life. The cases discussed, 
however, demonstrate that the sanctions forced the targeted states to accept international treaty 
obligations including human rights norms and modestly change their human rights policies. In 
most of the cases, the targeted state entered into a comprehensive agreement including the 
protection of human rights with the international community in order to have the sanctions 
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ultimately lifted. What is more, economic sanctions cannot be the sole cause of civilian suffering 
in the targeted states. The targeted states should bear the heavy burden of responsibility for this 
suffering. It is undeniable that economic sanctions have inherent flaws. However, they should 
not be abolished because of these flaws and negative effects. The problem is not in the sanctions 
themselves, but in their effect. Therefore, the criticism on economic sanctions should focus on 
finding a way to decrease their negative effects, rather than arguing against the use of economic 
sanctions without providing a better alternative. In addition, in order to reduce the negative 
impact of broad economic sanctions on civilian populations in the targeted states, the Security 
Council, the U.S. and the E.U. have actively discussed a way of mitigating any negative 
humanitarian impact.   
Overall, this paper concludes that economic sanctions have become part of a collective 
effort by the international community to develop current human rights norms and to protect and 
promote fundamental human rights in the targeted states. The international community has been 
increasingly willing to recognize gross human rights violation as a matter which threatens 
regional and international peace and to grant economic sanctions. Because of the increasing use 
of economic sanctions, this paper also concludes that the use of economic sanctions against gross 
human rights violations has become an accepted customary international norm. 
Chapter IV examines the legality of economic sanctions against human rights violations 
under the WTO system and reviews the possibility of harmonizing international economic law 
and international human rights law. The chapter concludes that while economic sanctions are 
inherently against the free trade provisions of the GATT, economic sanctions against gross 
human rights violations are allowed under the exceptional provisions of the GATT in the WTO 
system. This paper also argues that the GATT should be interpreted consistently with 
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international law. That is, trade restriction measures against gross human rights violations are 
compatible with the GATT. As discussed in Chapter II and III, fundamental human rights 
violations are no longer just the domestic concern of each individual state. The evolvement of 
international human rights law demonstrates that, first, international human rights norms 
recognized as Jus Cogens provide the legality for the international community’s intervention in 
offending states; and second, the Erga Omnes status of international human rights norms shows 
that every state has an interest in other states observing these human rights norms. All of these 
norms authorize economic sanctions not only by the international community, including the U.N., 
but also by each individual state. Overall, while some economic sanctions may conflict with the 
main goal of the WTO, i.e. free trade, economic sanctions against human rights violations do not 
undermine the WTO system itself. Rather, they can be adapted to the WTO’s free trade 
framework under international law. 
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there has been a 
significant evolution toward the universality of human rights. However, international legal 
enforcement systems for human rights norms are still underdeveloped despite the considerable 
progress in international human rights law. This paper concludes that economic sanctions can 
contribute to a decrease in individual states’ human rights violations and can be an effective 
enforcement tool for international law. 
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